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THE SCOPE OF CONGRESS' CONSTITUTIONAL 
POWER UNDER THE PROPERTY CLAUSE: 
REGULATING NON-FEDERAL PROPERTY TO 
FURTHER THE PURPOSES OF NATIONAL PARKS 
AND WILDERNESS AREAS 
Blake Shepard* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The National Park System has been heralded as one of the "few 
unambiguous triumphs of American public policy."l It is com-
prised of roughly forty-five million acres of predominantly 
federally-owned land2 that has been removed from the public 
domain and reserved by Congress for a specific public use.3 The 
fundamental purpose of the national parks is "to conserve the 
scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wildlife 
therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such 
manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the 
enjoyment of future generations."4 
In recent years, however, the activities of private industries 
and individuals have threatened to prevent many national parks 
and other specially protected federal reserves5 from fulfilling 
their declared purposes. For example, during the late 1960's and 
* Staff member, BoSTON CoLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. The 
author wishes to thank Brian O'Neill, Attorney, Faegre & Benson, Minneapolis, Min-
nesota, for his assistance in preparing this article. 
1. Sax, Helpless Giants: The National Parks and the Regulation of Private Lands, 75 
MICH. L. REV. 239, 239 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Sax, Helpless Giants]. 
2. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, SUMMARY OF ACREAGES (Sept. 30, 1982). 
3. P. GATES, HISTORY OF PuBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 28 (1968). See also Mc-
Nally, The Grand Canyon National Park Enlargement Act: Perspectives on Protection of 
a National Resource, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 232, 233-34 (1976); Note, The Sagebrush Rebellion: 
Who Should Control the Public Lands?, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 505, 508. 
4. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). 
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early 1970's, a logging company operating on private land immedi-
ately adjacent to Redwood National Park in California caused 
extensive physical harm within the boundaries of the park, in-
cluding soil erosion, stream siltation, and tree damage.6 Several 
years ago, a private entrepreneur erected a highly visible 300-foot 
steel observation tower on private property located immediately 
adjacent to Gettysburg National Military Park despite the 
strenuous objections of the National Park Service and the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania.7 Recently, Indiana Dunes National 
Lakeshore was threatened by a proposal to construct a nuclear 
power plant next to the park.s Currently, numerous parks are 
5. In addition to National Parks, Congress has reserved several other classifications of 
federal property from the public domain for special uses, such as National Forests, 16 
U.S.C. §§ 471-542 (1982); National Wildlife Refuges, 16 U.S.C. § 669-669i (1982); National 
Seashores, 16 U.S.C. § 459-459j-8 (1982); and National Recreation Areas, 16 U.S.C. 
§ 460n-460mm (1982). Most relevant for purposes of this article is the National Wilderness 
Preservation System, created by the Wilderness Act of 1964. "Wilderness" is defined as 
follows: 
(c) Definition of wilderness. A wilderness, in contrast with those areas where 
man and his own works dominate the landscape, is hereby recognized as an area 
where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man 
himself is a visitor who does not remain. An area of wilderness is further defined 
to mean in this Act an area of undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval 
character and influence, without permanent improvements or human habitation, 
which is protected and managed so as to preserve its natural conditions and 
which (1) generally appears to have been affected primarily by the forces of 
nature, with the imprint of man's work substantially unnoticeable; (2) has out-
standing opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of recre-
ation; (3) has atleast five thousand acres ofland or is of sufficient size as to make 
practicable its preservation and use in an unimpaired condition; and (4) may 
also contain ecological, geological, or other features of scientific, educational, 
scenic, or historical value. 
16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1982) (emphasis added). 
Lands designated as wilderness areas may include other classifications of federal 
property, such as National Parks and Forests; thus, the Wilderness Area classification is, 
in a sense, superimposed upon other federal land classifications. Coggins & McCloskey, 
New Directions for the National Park System: The Proposed Kansas Tallgrass Prairie 
National Park, 25 RAN. L. REV. 477, 503 (1977). Wilderness Areas are entitled to the 
highest degree of protection from human exploitation accorded to any federal land 
classification by federal law. Id. A wilderness area is by definition roadless. Id. at 504. It 
is to be preserved, to the maximum extent possible, in its primitive natural state, and its 
management is to be directed at protecting its integrity from human uses. Id. See infra 
text and notes at notes 252-58. 
6. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Sierra Club v. Morton, 
398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 376 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974). 
7. See Pennsylvania v. Morton, 381 F. Supp. 293 (D. D.C. 1974); Commonwealth v. N at'l 
Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 454 Pa. 193, 311 A.2d 588 (1973). 
8. See Izaak Walton League of America v. A.E.C., 515 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd and 
remanded, 423 U.S. 12 (1975); on remand, 533 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 945 (1976). 
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suffering from the adverse effects of air pollution generated by 
nearby industries and urban centers.9 
In addition to harm from activities occurring beyond the boun-
daries of national parks and wilderness areas, many areas are 
also subject to potentially adverse conduct occurring on non-
federapo landholdings located within their perimeter.ll There are 
over 2.5 million acres of non-federal land inside the boundaries of 
national parks12 and substantial non-federal inholdings within 
the borders of national preserves, seashores, lakeshores, river-
ways, and recreation areas.13 Such non-federal inholdings are 
particularly common among many recently established national 
parks and seashores located near heavily populated urban 
areas.14 
9. For example, during the late 1960's and early 1970's, pollution emitted by an 
aluminum processing plant located several miles from Glacier National Park caused 
damage to trees and vegetation within the Park. The problem has since been largely 
corrected by a substantial reduction in plant emissions. Telephone conversation with 
C. J. Martinka, Chief Scientist, Glacier National Park (Feb. 2; 1984). Similarly, air quality 
and visibility at Grand Canyon National Park has been adversely affected by particulate 
pollution from urban areas and industrial activities, such as copper smelting, in both 
Arizona and Southern California. Telephone conversation with Bill Dickinson, Manage-
ment Assistant, Grand Canyon National Park (Feb. 2, 1984). 
10. For purposes of this article, "non-federal property" refers to both privately-owned 
property and state-owned property. The term "non-federal property" will be used where 
it is unnecessary to make a distinction between private and state lands. When such a 
distinction is important, property will be specifically identified as being either state-
owned or privately-owned. 
11. In many instances, tracts of land located within a particular federal enclave 
passed into private ownership prior to the establishment of the enclave as a park or 
wilderness area. Sometimes the administering federal agency may acquire these tracts 
by purchase, donation, or condemnation; at other times, the tracts may be left in private 
ownership as "inholdings." In other cases,landowners may be able to convince Congress 
to exclude their land from the boundaries of a park, so that while such tracts may be 
physically within the park, they are legally outside its boundaries. Sax, Buying Scenery: 
Land Acquisitions for the National Park Service, 1980 DUKE L.J. 709, 713-14 [hereinafter 
cited as Sax, Buying Scenery]. Use of the term "inholding" in this article refers to 
non-federal property that is both physically and legally within the boundaries of a park 
or wilderness area. 
12. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, SUMMARY OF ACREAGES (Sept. 30, 1982). 
ACRES OF 
NON-FEDERAL 
13. LAND CLASSIFICATION TOTAL ACREAGE INHOLDINGS 
National Preserves 
National Seashores 
National Lakeshores 
National Riverways 
National Recreation Areas 
21,106,342 
598,663 
232,770 
550,184 
3,693,179 
713,401 
142,451 
106,802 
328,726 
336,612 
Source: NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, SUMMARY OF ACREAGES (Sept. 30,1982). 
14. Sax, Helpless Giants, supra note 1, at 239-40. 
482 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 11:479 
While these inholdings are in many instances devoted to uses 
compatible with the policies of the nationally protected areas, 
adverse uses of such non-federal lands in some cases may 
threaten the physical integrity of the parks and wilderness areas 
or conflict with the purpose for which the areas were estab-
lished.1s At Lassen Volcanic National Park, for example, a pri-
vately owned tract of land within the boundaries of the park, 
which for more than forty years had not been put to any private 
use, was leased in 1960 to an oil company for geothermal devel-
opment. Over the course of the next seventeen years, the oil 
company drilled exploratory wells on the site, built a road into the 
well site area, cleared land for a drill rig, and excavated a large 
trench before the land was finally condemned by the National 
Park Service.16 
The scenarios described above are only examples of the poten-
tial harm that could result to the nation's parks and wilderness 
areas from incompatible use of nearby non-federal propertyP 
They also illustrate the need for federal regulation of non-federal 
lands in and around national parks and wilderness areas in order 
to preserve those special federal enclaves for their intended public 
uses.1S 
These examples, however, represent only one side of a complex 
issue regarding Congress' authority over federal property. The 
United States owns roughly one-third of the nation's lands,19 
including over ninety percent of the entire state of Alaska and 
eighty-seven percent of Nevada.20 Furthermore, the federal lands 
15. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 552 F.2d 817 (8th Cir. 1977) (hunting on state 
waters within Voyageurs National Park) (see infra text and notes at notes 173-93); 
Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981) (use of motorboats on state waters in 
Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness) (see infra text and notes at notes 194-232). 
16. Sax, Buying Scenery, supra note 11, at 717-18. 
17. For a further discussion of the harm to National Parks caused by incompatible use 
of neighboring non-federal property, see generally Sax, Helpless Giants, supra note 1. 
18. See infra text and notes at notes 248-58. 
19. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, PUBUC LAND 
STATISTICS 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as PUBUC LAND STATISTICS]. 
20.· Id. at 10. The federal government also owns vast amounts of property in many 
other Western states: 
STATE 
Alaska 
Nevada 
Utah 
% OF STATE COMPRISED OF FEDERAL LAND 
90.6 
87.6 
65.1 
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contain a substantial portion of the nation's natural resources, 
particularly those related to energy production.21 National parks 
and wilderness areas constitute only a fraction of the lands owned 
and operated by the federal government,22 and are therefore only 
one part of a larger problem regarding the government's ability to 
regulate federal property.23 
In the West, where federal land ownership is most pervasive,24 
the government's extensive landholdings have become an eco-
nomic and political liability to the respective states.25 Federal land 
is immune from state property taxation;26 many Western states 
Idaho 63.7 
Oregon 52.5 
Wyoming 48.6 
California 46.1 
Arizona 44.2 
Colorado 35.6 
New Mexico 33.5 
Montana 29.6 
Washington 29.1 
Source: PuBLIC LAND STATISTICS, supra note 19, at 10 (1977). 
21. RESOURCE TOTAL U.S. TOTAL ON 
RESOURCES FEDERAL LAND 
Oil 144 billion bbls. 122.3 billion bbls. 84.9% 
Oil Shale 122 billion bbls. 87.8 billion bbls. 72% 
Natural Gas 1,975 trillion cubic feet 740 trillion cubic feet 37.4% 
Timber 820.1 million acres 365.1 million acres 45% 
Geothermal 
Energy 1,560 quadrillion btus 780 quadrillion btus 50% 
Coal 4 trillion ton s 148 billion tons 3.7% 
Uranium Ore 4.2 million tons 1.6 million tons 37.4% 
Source: Note, Sagebrush Rebellion: Who Should Control the Public Lands?, 1980 UTAH L. 
REV. 505, 511 [hereinafter cited as Sagebrush Rebellion]. 
22. The federal government owns in excess of 750 million acres of land. PuBLIC LAND 
STATISTICS, supra note 19, at 1. Of this total, only 45 million acres comprise the National 
Park System, and roughly 80 million acres are part of the National Wilderness Preserva-
tion System. NATIONAL FOREST SERVICE, NINETEENTH ANNUAL REPORT ON THE 
STATUS OF THE NATIONAL WILDERNESS PRESERVATION SYSTEM FOR 1982. Of these 80 
million acres of National Wilderness, 56.4 million acres are within the state of Alaska. I d. 
23. See infra text and notes at notes 263-65. 
24. Of all the land controlled by the federal government, 93.5% is located in 12 Western 
states. Titus, The Nevada "Sagebrush Rebellion" Act: A Question of Constitutionality, 23 
ARIz. L. REV. 263, 265 (1981). 
25. Sagebrush Rebellion, supra note 21, at 511-12. 
26. Id. at 511. See also Engdahl, State and Federal Power Over Federal Property, 18 
ARIZ. L. REV. 283, 373 (1976). 
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are thereby deprived of substantial tax revenues.27 Furthermore, 
federal lands are subject to both Congressional legislation and 
federal agency regulation.28 As a result, much of the land in the 
West is governed by restrictive federal land-use policies.29 Most 
importantly, perhaps, federal regulation of activity on govern-
ment property in many instances preempts state legislation,30 
thereby depriving the states of the ability to exercise their tradi-
tional police power authority over federal property within their 
boundaries.31 
In response to these factors, many Western states have recently 
expressed their vehement opposition to the federal government's 
extensive landholdings in the West.32 Leaders of the, so-called 
"Sagebrush Rebellion" have denounced the government's perva-
sive property interests as an intrusion upon the sovereignty of 
the Western states and as an ominous threat to the balance of 
state and federal legislative power.33 In 1979, the Nevada legisla-
ture expressed its disapproval of the situation by enacting a 
statute declaring that the jurisdiction and control of all public 
lands and minerals in Nevada belonged to the state.34 Numerous 
Western states followed Nevada's example and passed similar 
Sagebrush Rebellion bills.as Regardless of their validity, these 
statutes serve as a clear indication of the widespread public hostil-
ity in the West toward any reminder of the federal government's 
27. The federal government makes payments to public land states to help replace this 
loss of tax revenue, but payment of these "in-lieu" funds is made according to Congress' 
discretion. Sagebrush Rebellion, supra note 21, at 511; Engdahl, supra note 26, at 373. 
28. See infra text and note at note 113. 
29. Sagebrush Rebellion, supra note 21, at 510-11. 
30. See infra text and notes at notes 108-13. 
31. See infra text and notes at notes 108-13. 
32. See generally Sagebrush Rebellion, supra note 21; Titus, supra note 24. 
33. See generally Sagebrush Rebellion, supra note 21; Titus, supra note 24. 
34. Act of June 4, 1979, ch. 633, § 5(1) (Nevada) (codified at N.R.S. ch. 321.596-.599 
(1983». 
35. Sagebrush Rebellion legislation has also been passed in Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, 
Idaho, New Mexico, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. 1980 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 38, 
§§ 1-5, at 52-57 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-901-37-909 (Supp. 1980-81»; 1980 
Colo. Sess. Laws, House Joint Resolution No. 1006, at 857-58; Hawaii Senate Resolution 
No. 266 (1980); 1980 Idaho Sess. Laws, Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 129, at 1003-04; 
1980 N.M. Laws ch. 153, §§ 1-10, at 675-84 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-15-1 to 
19-15-10 (Supp. 1980); 1980 Utah Laws ch. 79, §§ 1-10, at 441-44; 1980 Wash. Laws ch. 116, 
§§ 1-10, at 358-60; 1980 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 53, §§ 1-3, at 264-67. The California Legislature 
has recently passed a bill commissioning a study of Sagebrush Rebellion issues and 
authorizing the state Attorney General to take legal action to vest the ownership of 
BLM lands in the state. 1980 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 831, § 2, at 2636-37. 
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pervasive property interests and its concomitant administrative 
authority over federal lands. 
The raging debate over the federal government's tremendous 
landholdings underscores the importance of defining the constitu-
tional limits of Congress' authority to regulate and administer 
federal property.36 Congress derives its primary authority to regu-
late activity on federal lands from the rarely-invoked Property 
Clause,37 which provides that "Congress shall have power to dis-
pose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the 
territory or other property belonging to the United States."36 At 
present, the scope of this constitutional power is unclear.39 Ulti-
mately, however, the extent of Congress' constitutional authority 
will have a profound impact upon the two competing concerns 
identified above: on one hand, the need to provide adequate regu-
lation and protection for national parks, wilderness areas, and 
other federal enclaves reserved by Congress for a specific pur-
pose;40 and on the other hand, the need to preserve the 
sovereignty of those Western states comprised largely offederally 
owned lands.41 
This article will examine the scope of the federal government's 
constitutional power to regulate federal property, and will focus 
particularly on its authority to regulate activity on adjacent non-
federal property. This article will first trace the Supreme Court's 
historical construction of Congress' power under the Property 
Clause,42 and will discuss two cases in which the Supreme Court 
has upheld Congress' authority to regulate activity on private 
property.43 Second, this article will discuss the expansive con-
struction of Congress' Property power outlined in the Supreme 
Court's most recent opinion on the subject.44 Third, this article 
will examine in detail two circuit court cases that sustained Con-
gress' broad powers to regulate activity on non-federal property 
in order to preserve national parks and wilderness areas for their 
36. See infra text and notes at notes 263-360. 
37. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
38.ld. 
39. The scope of Congress' constitutional power to regulate activity occurring on 
non-federal land is particularly unsettled. See infra text and notes at notes 114-72. 
40. See supra text and notes at notes 1-18. 
41. See supra text and notes at notes 19-35. 
42. See infra text and notes at notes 48-113. 
43. See infra text and notes at notes 114-36. 
44. See infra text and notes at notes 137-72. 
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intended purposes.45 Fourth, this article will analyze the conse-
quences of these two decisions and the resulting expansion of 
federal power under the Property Clause.46 Finally, this article 
will attempt to define some appropriate limits to Congress' au-
thority over federal lands by examining the Property Clause in 
light of Congress' other constitutional powers.47 
II. THE SCOPE OF CONGRESS' POWER OVER FEDERAL LANDS: 
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Congress derives its power to regulate the use of lands owned 
by the federal government from two distinct constitutional grants 
of authority: the Cession Clause48 and the Property Clause.49 At 
times, the distinction between these two provisions has been 
blurred,so creating uncertainty with regard to Congress' legisla-
tive authority over federal property. To comprehend fully the 
scope of Congress' regulatory power over federal lands, it is im-
portant to understand the differences between these two grants 
of authority. 
A. Congress' Power Under the Cession Clause 
Under the Cession Clause, Congress may obtain authority from 
a state to exercise legislative power over a federal enclave within 
that state in two ways: (1) by purchasing land with the consent of 
the state; or (2) by purchasing land without the state's consent 
and subsequently obtaining the state's cession, or consent, to 
federal legislative authority over the land.51 While the language of 
45. See infra text and notes at notes 173-232. 
46. See infra text and notes at notes 233-62. 
47. See infra text and notes at notes 263-360. 
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. The Cession Clause provides that: 
[Congress shall have the power] to exercise legislation in all cases whatsoever, 
over such District (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by Cession of 
Particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the 
Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places 
purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same 
shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, Dockyards, and other 
needful Buildings. 
U.S, CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 
49. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. See supra text and notes at notes 37-38. 
50. See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 541-42 (1976). 
51. See id. at 542. See also Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 264 (1963); Fort 
Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 541-42 (1885). A state often cedes jurisdiction 
over land within its boundaries by enactment of a statute. Sax, Helpless Giants, supra 
note 1, at 246 n.42. 
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the Clause specifies that Congress may only exercise its legisla-
tive authority under the Cession power for certain designated 
federal purposes,52 this language has been broadly construed to 
permit federal jurisdiction over land ceded for any legitimate 
governmental purpose.53 Congress' legislative power under the 
Cession Clause has been held to be derivative in nature,54 in the 
sense that it derives its authority over ceded property only by the 
consent of the ceding state. 
When the federal government acquires land within a state 
pursuant to a valid federal purpose, the state may consent to the 
acquisition, although it is not required to do SO.55 If the state 
consents to the acquisition, Congress' legislative authority over 
the land becomes exclusive.56 In such cases, state laws and regu-
lations issued under its police power are not enforceable within 
that federal enclave.57 The federal government then assumes the 
"combined powers of a general and a state government."58 
If the state refuses to consent to the government's acquisition, 
the degree of federal jurisdiction over the land is contingent upon 
a subsequent cession of legislative authority by the state.59 The 
extent of legislative power conferred by the state is determined by 
the specific terms of the state's cession.60 A state may still confer 
exclusive jurisdiction over the federal enclave to Congress by 
subsequently making "a cession of legislative authority and polit-
52. The Clause specifically authorizes Congress to exercise exclusive legislation over 
federal lands used as the seat of the federal government, or purchased for the erection of 
forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful governmental buildings. See 
supra note 48. 
53. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. at 542 n.l1. See also Collins v. Yosemite Park and 
Curry Co., 305 U.S. 518, 528-30 (1938). 
54. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. at 541-42. 
55. United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U.S. 138, 142 (1930); Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 
at 264-65; James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 147 (1937); Ft. Leavenworth R. 
Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. at 539. It is well established that the federal government may 
acquire land within a state by purchase or condemnation, even without the consent of 
the state. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371 (1875). But without the state's consent, 
the Supreme Court has held that the government's possession is simply that of an 
ordinary proprietor. Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. at 531; James v. Dravo 
Contracting Co., 302 U.S. at 141-42. 
56. Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. at 537-38; Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 
at 264. 
57. Pacific Coast Dairy v. Dep't of Agriculture, 318 U.S. 285, 294 (1945). 
58. [d. 
59. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. at 147. 
60. United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U.S. at 142; James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 
at 147. 
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ical jurisdiction."61 It is also well established, however, that a 
state may condition its cession upon its retention of certain juris-
dictional powers over the federal enclave, so long as the state's 
jurisdiction is not inconsistent with the federal purpose for which 
the property was acquired.62 A state may decide to make no 
cession whatsoever,63 or it may qualify its cession by reserving 
specific rights of jurisdiction over the federal enclave.64 The state 
may thereby retain its police power authority over the federal 
property so long as that power does not interfere with the gov-
ernment's use of that land.65 Therefore, federal jurisdiction ob-
tained by cession may range from exclusive federal jurisdiction 
with no residual state police power,66 to concurrent federal legis-
lative jurisdiction over the enclave, under which the state may 
retain some legislative authority.67 
Congress' power under the Cession Clause was once viewed as a 
major factor in determining the authority of the federal govern-
ment to regulate activity on non-federal lands within and around 
national parks.68 Traditionally, state cessions were considered the 
only grounds for federal legislative jurisdiction over non-federal 
lands within parks.69 In some instances, states were deemed to 
have explicitly ceded jurisdiction over all property, federal and 
61. Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. at 264; Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. at 
541. 
62. Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. at 265; James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. at 
147. 
63. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. at 147. See also, Colorado v. Toll, 268 U.S. 
228, 231 (1925). 
64. United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U.S. at 142; Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. at 264-65; 
James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. at 146-49. 
65. See supra cases cited at note 62. 
66. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. at 542. See also Pacific Coast Dairy v. Dept. of 
Agriculture, 318 U.S. at 294. 
67. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. at 542. For example, the Supreme Court has upheld 
a state's power to levy a tax on a railroad located within a federal military reservation, 
Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. at 525; to tax a contractor engaged in the 
construction of dams within a federal enclave purchased for the purpose of improving 
navigation, James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937); to enforce state price 
regulations on milk purchased for consumption or resale on federal military bases and in 
military clubs, Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245 (1963); to maintain state legislative 
jurisdiction over highways within the boundaries of a national park, Colorado v. Toll, 268 
U.S. 228 (1925); and to impose an excise tax on the sale of intoxicating liquor within a 
national park, Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518 (1938). 
68. Sax, Helpless Giants, supra note 1, at 248. See infra text and note at note 237. 
69. Sax, Helpless Giants, supra note 1, at 245. 
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non-federal, within the boundaries of a national park,70 thereby 
granting to the federal government the authority to regulate the 
entire park. In other cases, courts held that if a state had ceded a 
park to the federal government without retaining jurisdiction 
over privately owned land within the park, the government's 
exclusive jurisdiction over the park extended by implication to the 
non-federal lands as well.71 In such cases, the federal government 
was authorized to exercise exclusive police power jurisdiction 
over all lands within the park boundaries.72 
Such complete cessions of state jurisdiction over all lands 
within the park, however, have been the exception rather than 
the rule.73 While states routinely cede jurisdiction over allfederal 
lands within the parks,74 they often specifically retain jurisdiction 
over all non-federal lands inside park boundaries.75 In such situa-
tions, some courts have held that Congress may not regulate 
those non-federal inholdings.76 Thus, the breadth and scope of a 
state's cession of land within national parks was once deemed to 
have a substantial impact on the federal government's constitu-
tional authority to regulate activity occurring on non-federal 
property within park boundaries. 
In the recent case of Kleppe v. New Mexico,77 however, the 
Supreme Court substantially minimized the importance of state 
cessions as a constitutional basis for the federal administration of 
public lands. In Kleppe, the state argued that absent a cession of 
exclusive legislative authority over federal property by the state, 
the federal government lacked authority under the Property 
70. ld. at 246. 
71. See, e.g., United States v. Petersen, 91 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Cal. 1950), aff'd, 191 F.2d 
154 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 885 (1951); See also United States v. Unzeuta, 281 
U.S. at 145. 
72. Sax, Helpless Giants, supra note 1, at 246-47. 
73. ld. at 247. In a letter to Professor Sax dated August 12, 1976, D. Griggle, Acting 
Director of the National Park Service, wrote: "Exclusive jurisdiction is not uniformly 
ceded to the United States .... Of the 287 areas of the [Park] System, only about 72 have 
exclusive jurisdiction .... When the States cede exclusive jurisdiction, such cession 
normally covers all lands within the authorized boundary of the park, including private 
inholdings." ld. at n.45. 
74. ld. at 246. 
75. See, e.g., Halpert v. Udall, 231 F'. Supp. 574 (S.D. Fla. 1964), ajJ'd, 379 U.S. 645 (1965); 
Colorado v. Toll, 268 U.S. 288 (1925). 
76. See, e.g., Halpert v. Udall, 231 F. Supp. at 577. Cf Petersen v. United States, 191 
F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1951) (where state has ceded jurisdiction over private inholdings within 
a national park, the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over those lands). 
77. 426 U.S. 523 (1976). 
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Clause to enforce a statute78 regarding those federal lands that 
contravened state law. The Court rejected this argument, em-
phasizing that the Property Clause and the Cession Clause were 
two entirely distinct sources of constitutional power over federal 
property.79 The Court stated that while a cession of jurisdiction 
would be necessary for the federal government to exercise exclu-
sive legislative authority over the federal lands in question,BO 
Congress' jurisdiction over the land in question need not be exclu-
sive before it can exercise its other constitutional powers.81 The 
Court therefore found that Congress could enact legislation re-
specting federal land under the Property Clause, even in the 
absence of a cession.82 The Court further held that such federal 
legislation superseded conflicting state law under the Supremacy 
Clause.83 
Under the rule announced in Kleppe, Congress may enact legis-
lation pertaining to federal property, regardless of whether or not 
the state has consented to such federal legislative authority. 
Even in the absence of a cession, Congress still has the requisite 
jurisdictional authority to implement its other constitutional 
powers, including its Property Clause power. Therefore, the ex-
tent of Congress' modern constitutional authority over federal 
lands is largely defined by (he scope of its power under the Prop-
erty Clause. 
B. Congress' Power Under the Property Clause 
The Property Clause entrusts Congress with the constitutional 
authority to regulate the occupation and use of lands owned by 
the United States government.84 It authorizes Congress to per-
form two distinct functions: (1) to dispose of federal property; and 
78. See infra text and note at note 138. 
79. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. at 542-43. 
80. Id. at 542-43. 
81. Id. at 543. 
82. Ir}. 
83. Id. The Supremacy Clause provides: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of 
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in 
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of 
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
84. Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 405 (1916). 
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(2) to make "needful rules and regulations" respecting the federal 
lands.85 The Supreme Court has declared on several occasions 
that Congress' authority under the Clause is "without lim-
itations."86 It has also stated, however, that the limits of Congress' 
power under the Property Clause have not yet been definitely 
resolved.87 This article will now examine the various ways in 
which Congress has exercised its power under the Property 
Clause, and will attempt to define the scope of congressional 
power by examining past Supreme Court decisions. 
1. The Power to Dispose of Federal Lands 
It is well established that Congress is entrusted with plenary 
power to decide when, if, and how to dispose of federallands.88 In 
addition, the Supreme Court has recognized that Congress may 
impose conditions for the use of public lands upon any grant or 
sale of those lands.89 For example, in United States v. San Fran-
cisco,90 the Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of a 
grant of public land to the City of San Francisco to be used for the 
generation of water and electrical power.91 The federal grant 
prohibited the city from transferring any rights in the land to a 
private utility and required that all energy produced on the fed-
eral lands be supplied directly to consumers.92 The city subse-
quently transferred to a private utility the right to sell and dis-
tribute power to San Francisco residents.93 The Court found that 
this transfer violated the condition of the public land grant and 
held that the land should revert to the government.94 
, 85. u.s. CONST., art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. See supra text at note 38. 
86. See United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940); Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 
U.S. (13 Wall.) 92, 99 (1871); United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526, 537 (1840); 
Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273 (1954); United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 
474 (1914); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19,27 (1947); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. 
McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294-95 (1958); Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 523, 539 (1976). 
87. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. at 539. See also Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 89 
(1907). 
88. See generally United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940); United States v. 
Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526 (1840); Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954); United States 
v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1914); Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 92 (1871). 
89. See generally United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940). 
90.Id. 
91. Congress granted to the City certain lands in Yosemite National Park and Stani-
slaus National Forest. Congress intended for Congress to construct and maintain a 
means of supplying water and electricity to residents of the City. Id. at 18. 
92. Id. at 18-19. 
93. Id. at 28. 
94.Id. 
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Thus, Congress may use its power to dispose of federal property 
to achieve certain public policies by limiting the disposition of 
lands to uses which will implement those policies.95 Such use of 
the dispositional power enables Congress to regulate the use of 
lands even after government title in those lands has been trans-
ferred.96 
2. Congress' Power to Make Needful Rules and Regulations 
Respecting the Federal Lands 
The Property Clause also empowers Congress to make "needful 
rules and regulations" "respecting" federal property.97 This provi-
sion of the Clause is primarily a grant of power to Congress to 
regulate activity occurring on federal property.98 The Supreme 
Court has recognized, however, that Congress may, in limited 
circumstances, extend its regulatory authority beyond the boun-
daries of federal land and onto neighboring non-federal prop-
erty.99 
a. Regulation of Conduct Occurring on Federal Property 
The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress has broad 
powers under the Property Clause to protect federal lands from 
physical harmloo and to determine how those federal lands will be 
used.lOl The Court has repeatedly stated that the public lands of 
the nation are held in trust for its people by the federal govern-
95. Id. at 30. Congress has used its broad dispositional power under the Property 
Clause to achieve such important national goals as the construction of the transconti-
nental railroad and the rapid settlement of the West by granting vast amounts ofland to 
railroads and homesteaders. See generally Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897); 
Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668 (1979). See infra text and note at note 115. 
96. Gaetke, Congressional Discretion under the Property Clause, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 381, 
384 (1977). 
97. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. See supra text at note 38. 
98. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 89. 
99. See, e.g., Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897); United States v. Alford, 274 
U.S. 264 (1927). See infra text and notes at notes 114-36. 
100. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. at 526; United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. at 267; 
Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 405 (1916); Hunt v. United States, 
278 U.S. 96, 100 (1928). See also New Mexico Game Comm'n v. Udall, 410 F.2d 1197, 1200 
(9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 961 (1969); United States v. Lindsey, 595 F.2d 5, 6 (9th 
Cir. 1979); United States v. Arbo, 691 F.2d 862, 864 (9th Cir. 1982). 
101. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536 (1911); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United 
States, 243 U.S. at 404; Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. at 524. 
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ment.102 As trustee of those lands, it is the function of Congress to 
decide how the trust should be administered. loa Congress may 
"sanction some uses [of the federal lands] and prohibit others, and 
may forbid interference with such [uses] as are sanctioned."l04 For 
example, the Court has recognized Congress' power to create 
forest reserves on federal land and to prohibit grazing thereon;105 
to regulate or prohibit the use and occupancy of federal land for 
purposes of commercial electrical production;l06 and to prohibit 
individuals from obstructing access to federal lands in order to 
encourage their rapid settlement.107 
The Supreme Court has given great deference to federallegisla-
tion regarding the use of federal lands and their protection from 
physical harm. lOB Such legislation has been upheld even where it 
has infringed upon the states' traditional police power function.1OO 
While the states may retain general police power jurisdiction over 
all federal lands within their boundaries in the absence of a 
cession,l1O such jurisdiction does not extend to any matter that 
interferes with federal legislation pertaining to the protection and 
use of the federal lands.l11 When such a conflict exists, federal 
102. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. at 537; United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. at 
29; Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. at 273. 
103. See supra cases cited at note 102. 
104. McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 359 (1922). 
105. See, e.g., Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911). 
106. See, e.g., Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1916). 
107. See, e.g., Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897). 
108. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. at 536; Light v. United States, 220 U.S. at 537; 
Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. at 404-05. See also United States v. 
San Francisco, 310 U.S. at 29; United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 538. 
109. See, e.g., Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. at 526; Utah Power & Light Co. v. 
United States, 243 U.S. at 405. In Utah Power, the Court upheld a statute which gave to 
the Secretary of the Interior the sole authority to grant permits for rights of way on 
public lands for electrical power. The Court stated: 
The states and, the public have almost uniformly accepted federal legislation 
[concerning the public lands] as controlling, and in the instances where it has 
been questioned in this Court, its validity has been upheld and its supremacy 
over state enactments sustained .... [T]he inclusion within a state oflands of the 
United States does not take from Congress the power to control their occupancy 
and use to protect them from trespass and injury and to prescribe the conditions 
upon which others may obtain rights in them, even though this may involve the 
exercise in some measure of what is commonly known as the police power. 
243 U.S. at 405 (emphasis added). 
110. See supra text and notes at notes 59-67. See also McKelvey v. United States, 260 
U.S. at 359; Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. at 404-05. 
111. United States v. California, 332 U.S. at 36; McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. at 
359; Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. at 404-05. 
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legislation supersedes state law under the Supremacy Clause,112 
Thus, with respect to the use and protection of federal lands, the 
Supreme Court has given Congress broad discretion to determine 
what are "needful" rules and regulations "respecting" those 
lands, and has upheld Congress' use of its property power even 
when it conflicts with local interests.113 
b. Regulation of Conduct on Non-Federal Property 
A more serious constitutional question arises when the exercise 
of federal power affects activity occurring on non-federal property. 
The Supreme Court has upheld Congress' authority to regulate 
activity occurring beyond the boundaries of federal property on 
only two occasions. 
In Camfield v. United States,114 the defendants owned several 
112. Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. at 404-05; Kleppe v. New 
Mexico,426 U.S. at 543; United States v. California, 332 U.S. at 36; Hunt v. United States, 
278 U.S. at 99. In Hunt, a severe overpopulation of deer in a National Forest and Game 
Preserve led to overgrazing, which caused injury to the trees and shrubs on federal 
property. The Supreme Court upheld an order by the Secretary of Agriculture to kill 
many of the deer in the interest of protecting the federal lands, even though the order 
violated state hunting laws and resulted in the arrest of the foresters who carried out 
the Secretary's orders. The Court stated: "rr]he power of the United States to thus 
protect its land and property does not admit of doubt, statute of the state to the contrary 
notwithstanding." Hunt, 278 U.S. at 99. 
113. It is also well established that Congress may statutorily delegate to an adminis-
trative agency the authority to make rules and regulations respecting the occupancy, 
use and protection ofthe federallands. See generally United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 
506 (1911). Federal statutes may also provide criminal sanctions for the violation of such 
regulations.ld. Under 43 U.S.C. § 2 (1976), the Secretary of the Interior is given the 
power to perform "all executive duties apPertaining to the surveying and sale of public 
lands of the United States, or in anywise respecting such public lands." Courts have 
recognized that this statute entrusts the Secretary with broad authority to issue regula-
tions concerning the public lands. See, e.g., Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 
334, 336 (1963). The Secretary is also given specific legislative authority to pass rules and 
regulations pertaining to the National Park System. 16 U.S.C. § 3 (1982) provides that 
"the Secretary of the Interior shall make and publish such rules and regulations as he 
may deem necessary or proper for the use and management of the parks, monuments, 
and reservations under the jurisdiction of the National Park Service." Regulations 
issued by the Secretary have the force of law. See United States v. Petersen, 91 F. Supp. 
209 (S.D. Cal. 1950). See generally Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). 
Similarly, under 16 U.S.C. § 471 (1976) (repealed Pub. L. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2792 (1976», the 
Secretary of Agriculture was granted the power to issue rules and regulations by which 
to administer the National Forest System. Regulations passed hy the Secretary have 
been upheld as a constitutional exercise of federal power under the Property Clause. See 
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911); 
Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928). 
114. 167 U.S. 518 (1897). 
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odd-numbered tracts of land in a large "checkerboard" land 
scheme in which the federal government owned the alternating 
even-numbered tracts. us By constructing a network of fences 
built entirely on privately owned odd-numbered tracts, the defen-
dants successfully enclosed 20,000 acres of public land in violation 
of a federal statute.U6 The federal government subsequently sued 
to have the fences removed. The defendants argued that applica-
tion of the statute to fences located on private property exceeded 
the scope of Congress' constitutional authority under the Prop-
erty Clause.u7 The Supreme Court, however, found the fence to 
constitute a "nuisance"118 and sustained Congress' power to pre-
vent the enclosure of the public lands, even though the legislation 
at issue affected activity on privately owned land.ua 
Central to the Court's rationale in Camfield was its articulation 
of the legislative intent underlying the statute in question.120 
Tracing the factors that gave rise to the Act, the Court found that 
prior to the enactment of the statute, the government had suf-
fered serious abuses at the hands of private individuals occupying 
the odd-numbered checkerboard sections, who had repeatedly 
succeeded in enclosing tracts of government land for their private 
115. The federal government conceived the "checkerboard" land scheme as a means of 
encouraging the construction of the transcontinental railroad and the development of 
the Western United States in the nineteenth century. The Union Pacific Act of 1862 
granted federal land to the Union Pacific Railroad for each mile of track that it laid. 
Under the terms of the Act, the land within 20 miles of the railroad right-of-way was 
divided into checkerboard blocks; the odd-numbered lots were granted to the railroad as 
the track was laid, and the even-numbered lots were reserved to the government for 
subsequent sale. The purpose of the land grant policy was two-fold: first, it was designed 
to provide an incentive to the railroad to hasten construction of the project; second, the 
government hoped that the completed railroad would lure settlers to the West and 
increase the sales value of the reserved government blocks of land in the checkerboard 
scheme. For a colorful history of the checkerboard land plan, see Justice Rehnquist's 
majority opinion in Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668 (1979). 
116. The Unlawful Enclosures Act, Feb. 25, 1885, ch. 149, § 1, 23 Stat. 321 (codified as 
amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1061 (1982», states: 
All enclosures of any public lands in any State or Territory of the United States 
... are hereby declared to be unlawful, and the maintenance, erection, construc-
tion or control of any such enclosure is hereby forbidden and prohibited; and the 
assertion of a right to the exclusive use and occupancy of any part of the public 
lands of the United States in any State or any of the Territories, without claim, 
color of title or asserted right, as above specified as to enclosure, is likewise 
declared unlawful and hereby prohibited. 
42 U.S.C. § 1061 (1982). 
117. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. at 522. 
118. Id. at 525. 
119. Id. 
120. See supra note 116. 
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use.l2l Declaring that the government had a duty as trustee of the 
federal lands to prevent individuals from monopolizing those 
lands for private gain,122 the Court in Camfield concluded that 
Congress' decision to prohibit all enclosures of federal property123 
was designed to prevent the exclusion of prospective settlers from 
federal property by private individuals.124 
The Court analogized the Act to a state statute prohibiting the 
erection of "spite fences", 125 and held that it was within Congress' 
121. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. at 524-25. 
122. Id. at 524. 
123. The Court stated that even if the statute had not been enacted, the federal 
government would still have possessed the power as an ordinary proprietor to prevent 
the erection offences onfederal property under a common law trespass theory. Id. Thus, 
the statute expanded the government's power to protect its land by prohibiting the 
construction of all enclosures, whether built on federal or non-federal property. Id. 
124. Id. Prior to the enactment of the Unlawful Enclosures Act, the government had 
engaged in a policy of permitting, by tacit acquiescence, owners of the odd-numbered 
tracts of land to use the even-numbered federal lands for pasturage. Id. at 527. Control 
and monopolization of the government lands by proprietors of the odd-numbered lots 
within the checkerboard scheme finally became so extreme that Congress passed the 
Unlawful Enclosures Act to put an end to the abuses. Thus, while the government did 
not object to the use of the federal checkerboard lands for pasturage per se, id., the Act 
represented Congress' declaration that such use of the federal lands could not interfere 
with the government's broader policy of settling the federal lands: 
Id . 
These grants were made in pursuance of the settled policy of the government to 
reserve to itself the even-numbered sections for sale at an increased price .... If 
practices of this kind were tolerated, it would be but a step further to claim that 
the defendants, by long acquiescence of the government in their appropriation 
of public lands, had acquired a title to them as against everyone except the 
government and perhaps even against the government itself. 
. Thus, the Court in Camfield viewed the statute in question as a means of effecting 
Congress' policy of settling the western lands by preserving free public access to the 
federal lands in the checkerboard scheme. 
125. The Court referred to Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368, 19 N.E. 390 (1889), a case 
decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court which involved the constitutional-
ity of a state law prohibiting the erection of "spite fences." The Massachusetts statute 
was passed to put an end to the injustice of the prevailing common law doctrine, which 
recognized that "a man may build a fence upon his own land as high as he pleases, even 
though it obstructs his neighbor's lights, and ... his motives in so doing cannot be 
inquired into, even though the fence be built expressly to annoy and spite his neighbor." 
Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. at 523. The Massachusetts statute remedied this 
situation by declaring that any fence "unnecessarily exceeding six feet in height, mali-
ciously erected or maintained for the purpose of annoying the owners or occupants of 
adjoining property" should be deemed a private nuisance and that any proprietor 
injured in the quiet enjoyment of his land by such a fence had an action in tort for 
damages.ld. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld the constitutionality of 
the statute as a valid exercise of the state's police power. See Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 
at 373, 19 N.E. at 392. The Camfield court stated that the case was "authority for the 
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power to order the abatement of the defendants' fence.126 The 
Court described the basis of this constitutional authority as fol-
lows: 
The general government doubtless has a power over its own 
property analogous to the police power of the several states, 
and the extent to which it may go in the exercise of such 
power is measured by the exigencies of the particular case. If 
it be found necessary for the protection of the public, or of 
intending settlers, to forbid all enclosures of public lands, the 
Government may do so .... 127 
The Court further stated that while Congress did not possess an 
unlimited power to legislate against nuisances within a state,l28 it 
did have the authority to legislate for the protection of the public 
lands, even if it involved the exercise of what is ordinarily known 
as the "police power."l29 The Court noted that "a different rule 
would place the public domain of the United States completely at 
the mercy of state legislation."13o The Camfield Court thus con-
cluded that legislation enacted to "protect" federal property from 
"nuisances" constituted a needful regulation respecting federal 
land, even though the nuisances in question arose on private 
property. 
Over thirty years later, the Supreme Court resolved a far easier 
question concerning Congress' Property Clause authority to regu-
late activity on non-federal land. In United States v. Alford,l31 the 
defendant built a fire on private property adjacent to federal 
lands and failed to extinguish the fire before leaving the area, 
thereby violating a federallaw.132 The Court, in a brief opinion by 
Justice Holmes, held that Congress had the statutory authority to 
prohibit activity on privately owned land that imperiled federal 
proposition that the police power is not subject to any definite limitations, but is co-
extensive with the necessities of the case and the safeguard of the public interest." 
Camfield, 167 U.S. at 524. 
126. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. at 525. 
127. [d. (emphasis added). 
128. [d. 
129. [d. at 526. 
130. [d. 
131. 274 U.S. 264 (1927). 
132. The Act of June 25,1910, ch. 431, § 6,36 Stat. 855, 857 states: "Whoever shall build 
a fire in or near any forest, timber, or other inflammable material upon the public 
domain ... shall, before leaving said fire, totally extinguish the same; and whoever shall 
fail to do so shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more 
than one year or both." [d. at 266-67 (emphasis added). 
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property.l33 Finding that the purpose of the statute was to pre-
vent economically disastrous forest fires on federal lands,l34 the 
Court reasoned that "(t)he danger [to the federal lands] depends 
upon the nearness of the fire, not upon the ownership of the land 
where it is built."l35 The Alford Court therefore upheld Congress' 
authority under the Property Clause to regulate activity on pri-
vate property in order to protect adjacent federal lands from 
physical harm.136 
The Alford and Camfield decisions represent the only pro-
nouncements by the Supreme Court to date on the extent of the 
federal government's power to regulate non-federal property as 
an incident of its authority under the Property Clause. Although 
the constitutional principles at issue in Alford and Camfield re-
mained dormant for many years after these decisions, these prin-
ciples are now being reexamined as a result of the Supreme 
Court's most recent decision construing the scope of federal au-
thority under the Property Clause. 
3. The Supreme Court's Latest Word on the Property Clause: 
Expansion of Federal Power under Kleppe v. New Mexico 
The Supreme Court most recently examined the scope of con-
gressional power under the Property Clause in Kleppe v. New 
Mexico. 137 The issue in that case concerned the validity of a fed-
133. Id. at 267. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. Alford was recently followed in United States v. Lindsey, 595 F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1979). 
In Lindsey, two persons rafting down the Snake River in Idaho set up camp and built a 
fire along a section of the river surrounded by National Forests. The campsite was 
located on dry land below the river's high water mark and was therefore legally on the 
state-owned river bed. Appellees were charged with violating regulations issued by the 
Secretary of Agriculture prohibiting camping and the building of fires near the National 
Forests without permits. The Court upheld the validity of the regulations, stating that 
the Property Clause "grants to the United States power to regulate conduct on non-
federal land when reasonably necessary to protect adjacent federal property or naviga-
ble waters." Id. at 6. While the activity in question took place on state-owned land, and 
not on privately owned property as in Alford, the court made no reference to this 
distinction, and held that Alford controlled the case. Id. Similarly, in··United States v. 
Arbo, 691 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1982) the National Forest Service inspected Appellee Arbo's 
mining operation, located on state land within a National Forest, to verify Appellee's 
compliance with certain federal regulations. The court found that the inspection was 
reasonably necessary to ensure that private activity did not pose a fire or health risk to 
the adjacent federal land, and therefore held that the inspection was within the agency's 
power under the Property Clause. Id. at 865. 
137. 426 U.S. 529 (1976). 
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eral statute that established certain federal lands in the West as a 
refuge for wild horses and burros.l38 The state of New Mexico 
refused to recognize the authority of the federal government to 
manage the wild animals on the public lands within its bound-
aries.l39 Subsequently, the New Mexico Livestock Board, acting 
pursuant to state law,l40 seized nineteen wild burros from federal 
property and sold the animals at a public auction.l4l In response 
to the State's action, the Federal Bureau of Land Managementl42 
asserted jurisdiction under. the federal statute at issue and de-
manded the return of the seized animals.l43 The State filed suit 
challenging the constitutionality of the statute, claiming that the 
federal government lacked authority to control wild animals on 
public lands unless the animals were moving in interstate com-
merce or causing damage to federal lands.l44 In a unanimous 
138. The Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 85 Stat. 649, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 
(1982) was enacted in 1971 to protect all unbranded and unclaimed horses and burros on 
public lands of the United States "from capture, branding, harassment, or death." 16 
U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). The Act provides that all such horses and burros on the public lands 
administered by the Secretary of Agriculture or by the Secretary of the Interior are 
committed to the jurisdiction of the respective Secretaries, who are "directed to protect 
and manage [the animals] as components of the public lands ... in a manner that is 
designed to achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological balance on the public 
lands." 16 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982). The Act also prohibits private landowners from harming 
or capturing such animals that stray onto private lands and requires instead that 
landowners notify the federal authorities to have the animals removed from private 
land. 16 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982). See Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 531-32. 
139. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 533. 
140. The New Mexico Estray Law, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-14-1-47-14-10 (1966), grants to 
the New Mexico Livestock Board the authority to regulate, impound and sell estray 
horses, mules, and asses in the state. 
Under the New Mexico law, an estray is defined as: 
Any bovine animal, horse, mule or ass, found running at large upon public or 
private lands, either fenced or unfenced, in the state of New Mexico, whose 
owner is unknown in the section where found, or which shall be fifty (50) miles or 
more from the limits of its usual range or pasture, or that is branded with a 
brand which is not on record in the office of the cattle sanitary board of New 
Mexico .... 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-14-1 (1966). The New Mexico Livestock Board is the state agency 
charged with the duty of enforcing the New Mexico Estray Law. 
141. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 534. 
142. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) is a division of the Department of the 
Interior charged with the duty of administering the public domain, i.e., those lands 
owned by the federal government which are not reserved and protected for a special 
purpose. See generally 43 U.S.C. §§ 1-25b (1982); See also Reorg. Plan No.3 of 1946, § 403, 
eff. July 16, 1946, 11 F.R. 7876, 60 Stat. 1100. 
143. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 534. 
144. Id. at 533. 
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opinion, the Supreme Court sustained the federal statute as a 
valid exercise of congressional power under the Property Clause, 
and held that it superseded the conflicting state Estray Law.145 
In its brief in Kleppe, the State contended that Congress pos-
sessed only two types of power under the Property Clause: (1) the 
power to protect federal property; and (2) the power to dispose of 
and make incidental rules regarding the use of federal prop-
erty.146 The Court dismissed the State's contention, finding that 
while it had previously recognized Congress' power to prevent 
damage to federal property,147 it had never limited Congress' 
power to such situations.148 The Court stated that damage to 
federal land was a sufficient, but not a necessary, basis for con-
gressional regulation under the Property Clause.149 
The Court also held that the federal government's regulatory 
power extended beyond disposing of its property and making 
incidental rules as to its use. The Court instead adopted a more 
expansive construction of federal power under the Property 
Clause,150 stating that the Clause in broad terms gave Congress 
the power to determine what were "needful" rules "respecting" 
the public lands.l5l The opinion noted that the regulation of fed-
eral lands under the Property Clause was entrusted primarily to 
the judgment of Congress,152 and declared that federal power over 
the public land was without limitations.153 The Court reaffirmed 
Camfield's recognition of a federal power analogous to the state 
police power,154 stating that "Congress exercises the powers both 
of a proprietor and of a legislature over the public domain."155 
While the Court acknowledged that the Property Clause did not 
authorize an exercise of general federal control over state public 
policy, it nonetheless asserted that the Clause did permit "an 
exercise of the complete power which Congress has over particu-
145. Id. at 540-41. 
146. Id. at 536. 
147. See, e.g., Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928), and other cases cited supra 
note 100. 
148. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 537. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 539. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 536. 
153. Id. at 539. 
154. Id. at 540. See supra text and notes at notes 125-30. 
155. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 540. 
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lar public property entrusted to it."I56 In the unanimous opinion of 
the Court, that complete power included the authority to protect 
wild animals on those lands.157 
The overwhelming approval of the Wild Free-Roaming Horses 
and Burros Act in Kleppe marks a significant expansion of federal 
power in Property Clause jurisprudence. In contrast to previous 
Supreme Court decisions upholding congressional exercise of the 
Property power,158 the nexus between the legislation in Kleppe 
and the federal lands themselves is relatively indirect.159 By up-
holding Congress' authority to act as both proprietor and legisla-
ture with respect to federal property/60 the Court in Kleppe sus-
156. Id. (quoting United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. at 30). 
157. Id. at 540-41. The Court acknowledged that the government's assertion of Prop-
erty Clause authority was not based on any claim of ownership of the wild animals on the 
federal land. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 537 n.8. Rather, the Court adopted the federal govern-
ment's argument that a sufficient nexus existed between the protection of the wild 
animals and the federal property itself to sustain the Act under the Property Clause. See 
infra text and notes at notes 163-66. 
158. Compare, e.g., Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1916) (right 
of government to require power company to obtain permit to maintain powerhouses, 
pipelines, diversion dams, transmission lines and other subsidiary structures on federal 
forest reservations upheld); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947) (right of 
government to regulate removal of gas and other mineral deposits from sea beds be-
neath coastal waters upheld); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911) (right of 
government to reserve federal lands as national forest and prohibit grazing thereon 
upheld). 
159. Note, Constitutional Law-Expansion of National Power Under the Property 
Clause: Federal Regulation of Wildlife; Kleppe v. NeW Mexico, 12 LAND & WATER L. REV., 
181, 190 (1977). Congress' strained attempts to create a nexus between the federal 
property and the protection of wild horses and burros is manifest in the wording of the 
statute, which declares that in order to achieve its purpose of protecting the animals 
from capture, branding, harassment, and death, "they are to be considered in the area 
where presently found as an integral part of the natural system of the public lands." 16 
U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) (emphasis added). Section 3(a) of the Act also provides that the 
Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior are "directed to protect and manage [the 
animals] as components of the public lands . .. in a manner that is designed to achieve and 
maintain a thriving natural ecological balance of the public lands." 16 U.S.C. § 1333(a) 
(1982) (emphasis added). The Act also states that the animals preserved in their natural 
habitats "contribute to the diversity of life forms within the Nation and enrich the lives 
of the American people," and are "living symbols of the historic and pioneer spirit of the 
West." 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). 
In a case decided five years after Kleppe, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals went so 
far as to interpret Kleppe as holding that "any conduct taking place on United States 
land may be subject to congressional authority regardless of its relationship to that land." 
Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1248 n.16 (1981) (emphasis added). For a further 
discussion of Block, see supra text and notes at notes 194-232. 
160. See supra text at note 155. 
- - ----- -- ---------------
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tained federal legislation which more closely resembled a general 
police power regulation than a typical land use regulation.161 
C. Current Scope of Federal Property Power-Questions in the 
Wake of Kleppe 
While the Supreme Court's decision in Kleppe gives Congress a 
seemingly limitless mandate to regulate activity on federal prop-
erty, the decision expressly reserved judgment on a more difficult 
question concerning federal Property Clause power: that is, the 
extent to which Congress may regulate activity occurring beyond 
the boundaries offederal property.162 The Kleppe Court, acknowl-
edging its previous decision in Camfield, stated in dicta that "the 
power granted by the Property Clause is broad enough to reach 
beyond territorial limits."l63 Since the Court chose not to address 
the issue directly, however, the scope of Congress' authority to 
regulate non-federal land under the Property Clause remains 
unclear. 
A close examination of the Court's language in Kleppe suggests 
that the Court itself may be uncertain as to Congress' authority 
to regulate non-federal property. The Kleppe Court suggested two 
possible interpretations of its earlier holding in Camfield. On the 
one hand, the Court cited Camfield as sustaining the constitu-
tionality of Congress' proscription of fences on private property 
"when the regulation is for the protection of the federal prop-
erty."l64 On the other hand, it cited Camfield as upholding federal 
legislation "necessary for the protection of the public, or of the 
intending settlers [of the public lands]."165 In the context of the 
facts of the Camfield case, these two statements have entirely 
different meanings and reflect a persisting judicial uncertainty as 
161. The Court in Kleppe clearly distinguished Congress' powers under the Property 
Clause from its powers under the Cession Clause. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 542. The Court thus 
found that federal legislative jurisdiction under the Property Clause is not exclusive, so 
as to exclude completely the states' police power authority, unless there is a cession by 
the state.ld. at 543. See supra text and notes at notes 77-83. However, even when there is 
no cession, the range of subject matter upon which Congress may legislate under the 
Property Clause is considerably broadened under Kleppe to include many areas tradi-
tionally reserved to the state under its police power. Id. at 545. 
162. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 546-47. 
163. Id. at 538. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. (quoting Camfield, 167 U.S. at 525). 
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to what in fact Congress was "protecting" when it enacted the 
Unlawful Enclosures Act at issue in that case.166 
The distinction between these two interpretations, though sub-
tle, is extremely important. The defendants' fences in Camfield 
posed absolutely no threat of physical harm to the federal lands. 
Therefore, the legislation at issue in Camfield clearly cannot be 
viewed as a regulation to protect the lands from physical harm.167 
Rather, Congress' proscription against enclosures of federal prop-
erty was designed to further its policy of encouraging the settle-
ment of those federallands.168 In light of this declared federal land 
settlement policy, the Court found that the erection of a fence 
around federal property constituted a nuisance.169 Congress' pro-
scription of such enclosures thereby transformed an otherwise 
lawful act into an enjoinable nuisance.17o While there is language 
in the Camfield opinion that suggests that the Supreme Court 
was upholding only Congress' power to protect federal property 
per se, the facts of the case make clear that the Court in fact 
sustained Congress' authority to regulate non-federal property to 
protect federal policy pertaining to federal property.l7l 
As the confusing language in Kleppe suggests, however, the 
Supreme Court has not expressly recognized this distinction be-
tween the physical protection of federal lands per se and the 
protection of congressional policy regarding those lands. In cases 
subsequent to Camfield, the Court has generally cited that case as 
merely sustaining Congress' power to protect federal property 
from physical harmP2 As discussed above, however, a close read-
ing of Camfield suggests that it confers upon Congress the 
broader power to regulate conduct on non-federal property that 
interferes with a specifically designated purpose for the use of 
166. See supra text and notes at notes 114-30. 
167. Cf Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928); United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264 
(1927); New Mexico Game Comm'n v. Udall, 410 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v. 
Lindsey, 595 F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1979). 
168. See supra text and notes at notes 120-24. 
169. See supra text and notes at notes 125-27. 
170. Gaetke, The Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act of 1978: Regulating 
Non-Federal Property Under the Property Clause, 60 OREGON L. REV. 157, 172 (1981). 
171. See generally id. at 169-174. 
172. The Supreme Court's Property Clause decisions have repeatedly cited the literal 
language of Camfield for the proposition that Congress may legislate for the protection of 
federal lands from harmful activity occurring beyond the boundaries of the federal 
lands. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. at 538; Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. at 100; 
United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. at 267. 
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federal property. This interpretation of Camfield, if not consistent 
with all of the Supreme Court's language in Kleppe, is at least 
consistent with the spirit of Kleppe's expansive construction of 
federal authority under the Property Clause. 
Recently, two circuit court decisions have adopted this argu-
ment and have upheld Congress' authority to regulate non-
federal property in order to further the declared purpose of spe-
cially reserved federal lands. These decisions suggest that the 
Supreme Court will ultimately be forced either to endorse this 
view of Congressional power or to reconcile some serIOUS am-
biguities in its prior Property Clause decisions. 
III. EXPANSION OF THE PROPERTY CLAUSE AFTER KLEPPE: 
CONGRESS' POWER TO REGULATE NON-FEDERAL LAND TO 
FURTHER THE DESIGNATED PURPOSE OF FEDERAL PROPERTY 
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Kleppe in 1976, the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld the federal govern-
ment's authority to regulate non-federal property in and around 
national parks and wilderness areas on two occasions. Both deci-
sions were heavily influenced by the Supreme Court's expansive 
reading of the Property Clause in Kleppe, even though the Court 
in Kleppe expressly reserved the question of whether Congress 
could regulate conduct on non-federal lands. These two circuit 
court decisions permit Congress to regulate non-federal property 
in order to effect Congress' policy regarding the use of federally 
protected areas, thereby expressly adopting the rule implicitly 
recognized by the Supreme Court in Camfield. 
A. United States v. Brown 
The Eighth Circuit Court reached the first of its recent deci-
sions regarding the Property Clause in United States v. Brown. 173 
In that case, the defendant was convicted for duck hunting on 
state waters174 within Voyageur's National Park in violation of 
National Park Regulations.175 At the time and place of the viola-
173. 552 F.2d 817 (8th Cir. 1977). 
174. Although the waters in question were located within the boundaries of the park, 
the Court found them to be "owned" by the State of Minnesota. In the deed by which the 
state conveyed the lands in the park to the federal government, "all water power rights" 
were expressly reserved to the state. Brown, 552 F.2d at 820 n.3. For a further discussion 
of state "ownership" of waters, see infra text and notes at notes 260, 320-21. 
175. At the time of the infraction, 36 C.F.R. §§ 2.11 and 2.32 (1975) prohibited possession 
of a loaded firearm and hunting of wildlife in national parks, respectively. 
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tions, duck hunting by licensed hunters was permitted under 
state law.176 The defendant challenged the validity of the federal 
regulations, arguing that the State of Minnesota had not ceded 
jurisdiction over the waters in the park to the United States,t77 
thereby depriving the federal government of constitutional juris-
diction over those waters.178 The court of appeals sustained the 
defendant's conviction, holding that the state had in fact ceded 
jurisdiction over the waters in the park to the federal govern-
ment.179 The court further held that even in the absence of a 
cession, the regulation was a valid exercise of federal authority 
under the Property Clause.18o 
The Brown court acknowledged that the case presented the 
specific issue that the Supreme Court had expressly declined to 
address in Kleppe: namely, the scope of Congress' constitutional 
authority over non-federal property.18l Nevertheless, the Brown 
court referred to Kleppe on several occasions throughout its opin-
ion to support its holding. For example, the court observed that 
determinations under the Property Clause were entrusted 
primarily to the judgment of Congress, and noted that reviewing 
courts generally have given the clause an expansive reading.182 It 
also noted Kleppe's approval of Congress' power to regulate non-
federal property when such regulation is necessary for the "pro-
tection of federal property."183 
176. Brown, 552 F.2d at 819. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. See supra text and notes at notes 51-83. 
179. Even though Minnesota did not expressly cede jurisdiction to the government, 
the court found that the "state's active participation in the creation of Voyageurs Park 
with the knowledge that Congress intended that hunting would be prohibited through-
out the park was tantamount to a cession of jurisdiction over the lands and waters 
within the park boundaries." Brown, 552 F.2d at 821. The court also referred to a state 
statute that expressed Minnesota's concurrence with Congress' declared purpose in 
authorizing the creation of the park and its intent to preserve the outstanding scenery, 
geologic conditions and waterway system which constituted a part of the historic route 
of the Voyageurs. Id. 
180. Id. The court wrote: "[T]he presence or absence of federal jurisdiction obtained 
through a state's consent or cession is unrelated to Congress' powers under the Property 
Clause." Id. (citing Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. at 542-43). 
181. Id. at 822. The Court framed the issue before it as "whether the Property Clause 
empowers the United States to enact regulatory legislation protecting federal lands from 
inteiference occurring on non-federal public lands or, in this instance, waters." Id. at 822 
(emphasis added). 
182. Id. 
183. I d. at 822. 
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The Brown court, however, made clear that its decision was not 
based upon Congress' authority to protect federal lands per se. 
Nowhere in its decision did the Brown court suggest that the Park 
Regulat~ns at issue were designed to provide physical protection 
for the federal lands within the Park. Rather, the court indicated 
that the proscription of hunting was enacted to promote the 
federal policy underlying the creation of the park. It noted the 
district court's determination184 that hunting on park waters 
could "significantly interfere with the use of the park and the 
purpose for which it was established."185 The court then asserted 
that the government's authority to regulate non-federal property 
need not be limited to protecting federal property per se, stating 
that, "we view the congressional power over federal lands to 
include the authority to regulate activities on non-federal public 
waters in order to protect wildlife and visitors on the lands."186 
The court provided only a summary explanation of the constitu-
tional grounds for this exercise of federal power. Aside from its 
reference to the expansive language in Kleppe,187 the court cited 
as authority only the declaration in Camfield that the federal 
government "doubtless has a power over its own property analo-
gous to the police power of the several states."188 The court found 
statutory authority for the administrative regulations in section 
three of the National Park Service Act, which allows the Secre-
tary of the Interior to promulgate such "rules and regulations as 
he may deem necessary or proper for the use and management of 
the parks."189 The court held that in light of the congressionally 
declared policy for the establishment of the National Parks,190 the 
regulations at issue were "valid prescriptions designed to promote 
the purposes of the federal lands within the National Park."191 
184. 437 F. Supp. 56 (D. Minn. 1976). 
185. Brown, 552 F.2d at 822. 
186. Id. This language is similar to the Supreme Court's statement in Camfield that 
the exercise of federal power over non-federal property is appropriate when "necessary 
for the protection of the public, or of intending settlers." Camfield, 167 U.S. at 525. The 
regulations in both cases are aimed at protecting federal policy regarding the federal 
lands, not the lands themselves. 
187. See supra text and notes at notes 181-83. 
188. Brown, 552 F.2d at 822 (quoting Camfield, 167 U.S. at 525). 
189. 16 U.S.C. § 3 (1982). 
190. The court noted that the fundamental purpose of the national parks, including 
Voyageurs Park, is to "conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the 
wildlife therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by 
such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations." 
Brown, 552 F.2d at 822 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)). 
191. Brown, 552 F.2d at 822-23. 
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Under the rule articulated in previous Supreme Court cases,192 
the court stated that such a valid exercise of the Property Clause 
power must necessarily override the conflicting state law permit-
ting hunting within the park.193 
B. State of Minnesota by Alexander v. Block 
Four years later, the Eighth Circuit reached a similar decision 
inState of Minnesota by Alexanderv. Block. 194 In Block, the State 
of Minnesota challenged the constitutionality of portions of a 
federal statute195 that restricted motorized travel on non-federal 
lands and waters located within the Boundary Waters Canoe 
Area (BWCA), a national wilderness area196 in Northern Min-
nesota. The BWCA had long been a source of conflict between 
state and federal regulatory authority197 as a result of the area's 
bifurcated state/federal ownership structure. Of the more than 
one million acres within the BWCA, 160,000 acres are comprised of 
navigable lakes and streams, the beds of which are owned by the 
State of Minnesota.198 In addition, the State owns 121,000 acres of 
land, while the United States owns approximately 792,000 acres of 
land.199 
Throughout most of its history, the BWCA had been man-
aged jointly by the state and federal governments200 under an 
192. See supra text and notes at notes 110-12. 
193. Brawn, 552 F.2d at 823. 
194. 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944 (1982). 
195. The Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-495, 92 
Stat. 1649 (1978) [hereinafter cited as BWCA W Act]. 
196. The BWCA was included as part of the National Wilderness Preservation System 
established under the Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-36 (1976). See supra 
note 5. 
197. See, e.g., Izaak Walton League of America v. St. Clair, 313 F. Supp. 1312 (1970), 55 
F.R.D. 139 (1972),353 F. Supp. 698 (1973), 497 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 
1009 (1974). 
198. Block, 660 F.2d at 1247. The network oflakes and streams within the BWCA are 
"navigable waters of the United States," based on their use as a trade route by canoe-
traveling fur traders. See Brief of Appellees Sierra Club at 40, Minnesota v. Block, 660 
F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Brief of 
Sierra Club]. As such, they are subject to Congress' regulatory authority over navigable 
waters pursuant to the federal commerce power. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 
1, 189 (1824). 
199. Block, 660 F.2d at 1247. Private parties own approximately 7300 acres of land in 
the BWCA. [d. at n.12. 
200. The BWCA has been the subject of extensive legislation enacted by both the state 
and federal governments. See Block, 660 F.2d at 1245-48. For a thorough recounting of 
the history oflegislative enactments pertaining to the BWCA, see Izaak Walton League 
of America v. St. Clair, 353 F. Supp. at 702-07. 
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arrangement whereby the federal government generally regu-
lated motorized travel over the federal lands within the area, and 
the state generally retained jurisdiction over the waters.201 While 
201. As a general rule, federal regulations enacted before passage of the BWCAW Act 
in 1978 avoided extending the Secretary's authority to non-federal lands or waters. For 
example, a 1965 regulation attempting to limit motor travel in the BWCA was worded as 
follows: 
No motor or other mechanical device capable of propelling a watercraft through 
water shall be transported across National Forest land except over routes 
designated by the Chief, Forest Service, who shall cause a list and a map of all 
routes so designated and any special conditions governing their use to be 
maintained for public reference. 
36 C.F.R. § 251.85 (1965) (emphasis added). Thus, the Secretary regulated motorized 
travel on federal lands and, based upon control of land access to certain waters, the 
motorized use of those waters. Statement of the Commissioner of National Resources 
Joseph N. Alexander Regarding the State of Minnesota's Litigation Concerning Asser-
tion by the Federal Government of Jurisdiction Over Certain of the Public Waters 
Located Within the Superior National Forest, at 1 n.1 [hereinafter cited as Statement of 
the Commissioner of Natural Resources]. In accordance with this limit on federal regula-
tory authority, jurisdiction over the waters within the BWCA prior to 1978 was vested in 
the State. In its Management Plan for the BWCA, the Department of Agriculture stated: 
Control over water use on the International Boundary waters is of concern to 
both the U.S. and Canada .... Jurisdiction over surface use is shared by the State 
of Minnesota and the Province of Ontario in Canada. 
Control over surface uses of the waters further inland is vested in the State, 
particularly the Department of Natural Resources. 
U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Forest Service, Boundary Waters Canoe Area Management 
Plan and Environmental Statement 136-37 (1974) (emphasis added). The State, pursuant 
to rules promulgated by the Department of Natural Resources, regulated motorized use 
of both the surface of public waters and state lands in the BWCA. Under these regula-
tions, the state generally prohibited motor use except in those areas permitted by the 
Secretary of Agriculture's regulations. See Mn. N.R. 1000, (bX2Xaa). Thus, prior to the 
enactment of the BWCA W Act, jurisdiction over the area was generally shared by the 
federal and state governments as follows: the Secretary of Agriculture exercised juris-
diction over federal property only, and Minnesota exercised jurisdiction over state land 
and the public waters within the area. Statement of the Commissioner of Natural 
Resources, supra note 201, at 1. 
However, as intervenor/appellee Sierra Club noted in its brief in Block, the federal 
government did in fact exercise regulatory authority over waters within the BWCA in 
certain circumstances. Brief of Sierra Club, supra note 198, at 8-9. See, e.g., Ship stead-
Nolan Act, Act of July 10, 1930, ch. 881, 46 Stat. 1020 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 577-577b 
(1982), which prohibits logging within 400 feet of any lake shore within the BWCA and 
restricts the alteration of the water levels within the canoe area to protect the federal lands 
from flooding. See also 1899 Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403 (1976); The 
Motorboat Act of 1940, 46 U.S.C. § 526-526(u) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); The Federal Boat 
Safety Act of 1971, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1489 (1974 & Supp. V 1981); and the 1972 Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). However, these 
latter statutes were merely general regulations pertaining to a wide range of navigable 
waters and did not specifically regulate activity on waters within the BWCA. Their 
impact on the state's ability to regulate motorized travel on those waters, therefore, was 
only indirect. 
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seemingly simple, this system created a great deal of confusion 
and litigation.202 This confusion was compounded in 1964, when 
the BWCA was included in the national wilderness system under 
the Wilderness Act of 1964.203 That Act generally prohibited the 
use of motorized vehicles in all national wilderness areas, but 
included a special proviso for the BWCA, permitting the con-
tinued use of motorboats in that area.204 
In response to the confusion generated by this proviso and the 
broader concern for preserving the wilderness character of the 
BWCA,205 Congress enacted the Boundary Waters Canoe Area 
202. Block, 660 F.2d at 1246. See supra text and note at note 197. 
203. Pub. L. No. 88-577 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1982». 
204. The general prohibition of motorized travel in national wilderness areas is con-
tained in 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (1982). The BWCA exception was contained in 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1133(d)(5) (1976), which provided as follows: 
Other provisions of this chapter to the contrary notwithstanding, the manage-
ment of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area ... shall be in accordance with 
regulations established by the Secretary of Agriculture in accordance with the 
general purpose of maintaining, without unnecessary restrictions on other uses, 
including that of timber, the primitive character of the area, particularly in the 
vicinity of lakes, streams, and portages; Provided, that nothing in this chapter 
shall preclude the continuance within the area of any already established use of 
motorboats. 
16 U.S.C. § 1133(dX5) (1976). 
Pursuant to this mandate, the Secretary of Agriculture issued a management plan for 
the area designating specific routes for motorized travel within the BWCA. See 36 C.F.R. 
§ 251.85 (1965). 
205. Block, 660 F.2d at 1246. Sections one and two of the BWCAW Act manifest 
Congress' intent to promote the use ofthe BWCA as a wilderness reserve. The Act states 
as follows: 
FINDINGS 
SECTION 1. The Congress finds that it is necessary and desirable to provide for 
the protection, enhancement, and preservation of the natural values of the lakes, 
waterways, and associated forested areas known as the Boundary Waters Canoe 
Area, andfor the orderly management of public use and enjoyment of that area as 
wilderness, and of certain contiguous lands and waters, while at the same time 
protecting the special qualities of the area as a natural forest-lakeland wilderness 
ecosystem of major esthetic, cultural, scientific, recreational and educational 
value to the Nation. 
PURPOSES 
SEC. 2. It is the purpose of this Act to provide for such measures respecting the 
areas designated by this Act as the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness 
and Boundary Waters Canoe Area Mining Protection Area as will-
(1) provide for the protection and management of the fish and wildlife of the 
wilderness so as to enhance public enjoyment and appreciation of the unique 
biotic resources of the region, 
(2) protect and enhance the natural values and environmental quality of the 
lakes, streams, shorelines and associated forest areas of the wilderness, 
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Wilderness Act of 1978 (BWCA W Act).206 The Act specifically 
barred the use of motorboats and snowmobiles in all but certain 
limited portions of the wilderness area,207 thereby prohibiting 
motorized travel on hundreds of thousands of acres of both state 
and federal property.208 While the Act stated that Minnesota 
would retain its jurisdiction over the waters within the BWCA, it 
prohibited the State from regulating those waters in a manner 
less stringent than that mandated by the Act.209 The practical 
consequence of this proviso was to prohibit the state from allow-
ing motorized travel in those areas protected by the federal stat-
ute. 
The State challenged the constitutionality of those provisions of 
the federal statute that applied to non-federal lands and waters, 
arguing that they exceeded Congress' power under the Property 
Clause.210 The court, following the rule previously announced in 
(3) maintain high water quality in such areas, 
(4) minimize to the maximum extent possible, the environmental impacts 
associated with mineral development affecting such areas, 
(5) prevent further road and commercial development and restore natural 
conditions to existing temporary roads in the wilderness, and 
(6) provide for the orderly and equitable transition from motorized recre-
ational uses to nonmotorized recreational uses on those lakes, streams, and 
portages in the wilderness where such mechanized uses are to be phased out 
under the provisions of this Act. 
Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-495, §§ 1-2,92 Stat. 
1649 (1978) (emphasis added). 
206. See supra note 195. 
207. Section 4(c) of the Act provides: "Effective on January 1, 1979, the use of motor-
boats is prohibited within the wilderness designated by this Act, and that portion within 
the wilderness of all lakes which are partly within the wilderness." The section provides 
a list of lakes upon which the use of motorboats is still permitted. The section also 
imposes restrictions on the size of motors permitted on those lakes exempted from the 
Act's general prohibition of motorboats. Section 4(e) of the Act prohibits the use of 
snowmobiles within the BWCA, except on two routes upon which the Secretary of 
Agriculture may choose to permit their use. 
208. Block, 660 F.2d at 1244. 
209. Specifically, § 15 of the Act provides: 
The Secretary is authorized to promulgate and enforce regulations that limit or 
prohibit the use of motorized equipment on or relating to waters located within 
the wilderness in accordance with the provisions of this act: Provided, that 
nothing in this act shall be construed as affecting the jurisdiction or respon-
sibilities of the state with respect to such waters, except to the extent that the 
exercise of such jurisdiction is less stringent than the Secretary's regulations 
promulgated pursuant to this section. 
Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-495, § 15,92 Stat. 
1649 (1978). 
210. Block, 660 F.2d at 1244. 
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United States v. Brown,211 held that the statute was a valid exer-
cise of the federal government's Property Clause power, and sus-
tained Congress' authority to regulate non-federal lands and wa-
ters within the BWCA.212 
As in Brown, the Eighth Circuit Court acknowledged that it had 
to resolve the issue left open in Kleppe: that is, the scope of 
Congress' Property Clause power over activity occurring on non-
federal property.213 Once again, however, the court relied on the 
Kleppe decision for "guidance,"214 and noted that Kleppe de-
manded a broad construction of the Property Clause.215 The court 
then examined the Supreme Court's decision in Camfield v. 
United States,216 and concluded that Congress possessed the 
power to control conduct on non-federal property as an incident of 
its power to protect the public lands.217 The court further stated 
that Congress had the power to dedicate federal lands for particu-
lar purposes.218 The court then reasoned that this power, com-
bined with Congress' power to protect federal property, necessar-
ily extended to permit the "regulation of conduct on or off the 
public land that would threaten the designated purpose of federal 
lands."219 
The court noted that its approval of this federal power was 
consistent with its earlier decision in Brown.220 It stated that the 
purpose of the regulations in Brown extended beyond the "mere 
protection of the federal land from physical harm."221 Rather, 
argued the court, the federal regulations sustained in Brown 
211. 552 F.2d 817. See supra text and notes at notes 173-93. 
212. Block, 660 F.2d at 1244. 
213. Id. at 1248. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. The Court interpreted Kleppe broadly, stating: 
Prior to Kleppe, language in Supreme Court opinions supported the argument 
that Congress' power over federally owned property did not exceed 'the rights of 
an ordinary proprietor' .... [T]he Court in Kleppe, however, rejected any narrow 
construction of the property clause, holding that Congress possessed full 
legislative/police power over activity occurring on federal property. In other 
words, any conduct taking place on United States land may be subject to 
congressional authority, regardless of its relationship to that land. 
Id. n.16. 
216. 167 U.S. 518. See supra text and notes at notes 114-30. 
217. Block, 660 F.2d at 1249. 
218. Id. See supra text and notes at notes 101-07. 
219. Block, 660 F.2d at 1249. 
220. [d. 
221. Id. 
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were necessary to prevent significant interference with the use of 
the park and the purposes for which it had been established.222 On 
the basis of its decision in Brown and the Supreme Court's ac-
knowledgment in Camfield and Kleppe of Congress' general power 
to regulate activity on non-federal property, the court concluded 
that Congress had the constitutional power to regulate conduct 
on non-federal land that interfered with the intended purposes of 
federal property. 223 
After setting out the constitutional limits of federal power 
under the Property Clause, the court turned to the statutory 
provisions at issue.224 It acknowledged that Congress' judgment 
under the Clause was entitled to judicial deference.225 The court 
then engaged in a limited two-step analysis of the challenged 
provisions, restricting its inquiry to the following two issues: 
(1) whether the statutory restrictions were enacted to protect the 
fundamental purpose for which the BWCA was reserved; and 
(2) whether they were reasonably related to that purpose.226 Look-
ing first at the purpose of the federal lands within the BWCA, the 
court found that Congress had enacted the BWCA W Act "with 
the clear intent of insuring that the area would remain as wilder-
ness and could be enjoyed as such."227 It further noted that Con-
222. Id. 
223. Id. Although the Block decision unequivocally sustained Congress' power to 
regulate activity on non-federal land to promote the purposes of federal lands, its in-
terpretation of past Supreme Court decisions is perplexing. The Supreme Court came 
closest to articulating the Block holding in Camfield; however, the Block court over-
looked the language in Camfield that best supports Congress' power to regulate beyond 
federal lands to further the purpose of those lands. See supra text and notes at notes 
164-71. Rather, the Block court read Camfield as sustaining Congress' power to regulate 
non-federal lands only for purposes of protecting the public lands. Block, 660 F.2d at 1249. 
In so doing, the court ignored compelling Supreme Court language in support of its 
holding. Without this support from Camfield, the court's conclusion that Congress may 
regulate non-federal lands for policy reasons is based strictly on common sense reason-
ing: 
Under this authority to protect public land Congress' power must extend to 
regulation of conduct on or off the public land that would threaten the desig-
nated purpose of federal lands. Congress clearly has the power to dedicate 
federal land for particular purposes. As a necessary incident of that power, 
Congress must have the ability to insure that these lands be protected against 
interference with their intended purposes. 
Id. Therefore, while the Court's reasoning does make sense intuitively, it lacks the 
foundation of Supreme Court precedent that Camfield clearly provides. 
224. Id. at 1250. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. 
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gress' specific proscription of the use of motorboats was enacted in 
order to enhance the wilderness character of the area.228 The 
court reasoned that by restricting the use of motorized vehicles in 
the BWCA, Congress was bringing the BWCA in line with other 
areas in the wilderness system where, as a general rule, 
motorized travel is statutorily prohibited.229 According to the 
Block court, the BWCAW Act reflected Congress' recognition that 
"the use of motor vehicles could not be reconciled with retaining a 
primitive wilderness area."230 On the basis of the evidence pre-
sented, the court concluded that it was reasonable for Congress to 
restrict the use of motorboats to further the BWCA's wilderness 
228. Id. The Court quoted the comments of Congressman Fraser, who introduced the 
bill in the House: "The bill has four major thrusts. First and most important, it seeks to 
end those activities that threaten the integrity of the BWCA's wilderness character by 
expressly prohibiting ... recreational uses of motorized watercraft and snowmobiles." Id. 
It is arguable that the proscription of motorized travel protects the federal lands in the 
BWCA from physical and environmental harm. Indeed, Congress was presented with 
some testimony concerning the physically damaging effects of motorboat use in the 
BWCA. See Brief of Sierra Club, supra note 198, at 24. However, both the Sierra Club and 
the State of Minnesota agreed that the regulations were designed to further the purpose 
a/the BWCA as a wilderness area, and were not primarily enacted to provide protection 
for the federal lands themselves. See, Brief of Sierra Club, supra note 198, at 23; Brief of 
Appellant State of Minnesota at 8, Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. 
denied 456 U.S. 944 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Brief of State of Minnesota]. In its brief, 
the State attempted to obscure the importance of the motorboat regulations by arguing 
that they involved merely a question of "recreational preference." Brief of State of 
Minnesota at 8-11. While in a very literal sense the proscription of motorboats is merely a 
declaration of Congress' preference ofthe use of canoes to the use of motorboats, this is a 
shortsighted view of the statute's purpose. The legislative history of the provisions, 
which the State itself cites in its brief, makes clear that Congress' declaration of "recre-
ational policy" is integrally related to preserving the wilderness character of the area. In 
his statement on the Senate Floor, Minnesota Senator Wendell Anderson said: "The 
question for the Senate ... is what kinds of recreational use to permit to maintain the 
BWCA as a lakeland wilderness." 124 Congo Rec. 637 (1978), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE BOUNDARY WATERS ACT OF 1978, at 143 (emphasis added). The State's 
brief also quoted Minnesota Congressman Vento, who stated that canoeists felt that 
motorboats "disrupted their wilderness experience;" Brief of State of Minnesota at 9 
(quoting 124 CONGo REC. 4944 (1978), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE BOUND-
ARY WATERS ACT OF 1978, at 119, 125); and Rep. Burton, who stated: "We are trying to 
give some tilt to the canoe wilderness experience in this magnificently beautiful part of 
our country." Brief of State of Minnesota at 10 (quoting 124 Congo Rec. 4953 (1978) 6/5178) 
(remarks of Rep. Burton), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE BOUNDARY WA-
TERS ACT OF 1978 at 128. 
These remarks cited by the State in its brief belie its contention that Congress' 
decision to proscribe motorboats was merely an issue of recreational preference. While 
the primary purpose of the regulation was not to protect the federal lands in the BWCA, 
they were specifically enacted to promote the use of the area as a wilderness reserve. 
229. Block, 660 F.2d at 1251 n.21. The Wilderness Act prohibits motor travel generally 
in all national wilderness areas. See supra text and note at note 204. 
230. Block, 660 F.2d at 1251 n.21. 
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purpose231 and upheld the restrictions under the Property Clause 
as "needful regulations respecting public lands."232 
c. Analysis of Brown and Block: A Victory for National Parks 
and Wilderness Areas 
The Eighth Circuit's decisions in Brown and Block signify an 
important development of federal power under the Property 
Clause. Using Kleppe as their starting point,233 these opinions 
expand Congress' Property Clause authority beyond limits ex-
pressly sanctioned by the Supreme Court in two significant re-
spects. First, they explicitly recognize the authority of Congress 
to regulate activity on non-federal property, even when that ac-
tivity poses no threat of physical harm to federal property.234 
Second, the decisions recognize Congress' authority under the 
Property Clause to regulate all forms of non-federal land, state as 
well as private.235 
These two developments should be of particular interest to the 
National Park Service and other federal agencies charged with 
the duty of administering and protecting government property. 
Historically, the Park Service has taken an extremely narrow 
view of its own constitutional authority to regulate activity on 
non-federal property. The Brown and Block decisions provide the 
Park Service with a constitutional basis for regulating activity on 
non-federal property when necessary to promote the purpose of 
the government lands under its domain. These two cases there-
fore signify an important victory for national parks, wilderness 
231. [d. at 1251. The court noted: "Testimony established that the sight, smell, and 
sound of motorized vehicles seriously marred the wilderness experience of canoeists, 
hikers, and skiers, and threatened to destroy the integrity of the wilderness." 
232. [d. The court in Block also rejected the state's contention that the regulation of 
state land and waters constituted a violation of the Tenth Amendment. [d. at 1251-53. 
For a further discussion of the Tenth Amendment as a potential limit on federal power 
under the Property Clause, see infra text and notes at notes 305-32. 
,233. See Brown, 552 F.2d at 822; Block, 660 F.2d at 1246. 
234. In the two previous cases in which the Supreme Court has upheld Congress' 
power to affect activity occurring on non-federal lands, the regulation was either de-
signed to protect the federal lands from harm per se, United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264 
(1927) (proscription of fires on land adjacent to federal property), or was phrased by the 
Court in terms of protecting the federal property, Camfield v. United States 167 U.S. 518 
(1897) (proscription of fences on property adjacent to federal land). See supra text and 
notes at notes 114-36. 
235. In both Alford and Camfield, the Supreme Court upheld Congress' regulation of 
activity occurring on private land adjacent to federal property. See supra text and notes 
at notes 114-36. 
--------
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areas, and other federal enclaves which Congress has reserved for 
a specific public purpose. 
1. The Federal Government's Past Timidity Regarding 
Regulation of Non-Federal Property Near Parks and 
Wilderness Areas 
Historically, national parks, wilderness areas, and other spe-
cially protected federal enclaves have been vulnerable to adverse 
activity on non-federal lands located both within and adjacent to 
their boundaries.236 Problems created by the incompatible use of 
non-federal lands within and around the parks have been com-
pounded by the National Park Service's narrow interpretation of 
its own Property Clause powers237 and by the limited statutory 
authority that Congress has granted to the Service to regulate 
non-federal property.238 Among the numerous federal statutes 
establishing national parks, very few have granted the Park Ser-
vice the express authority to regulate activity occurring on non-
federal inholdings.239 In the few instances in which Congress has 
deemed such controls necessary, it has chosen to impose regula-
tions on non-federal land indirectly-for example, by encouraging 
local government entities to pass their own zoning laws to help 
236. See supra text and notes at notes 1-18. 
237. For many years, the Park Service adhered to the position that it could not 
regulate non-federal lands within a park in the absence of a cession by the state. Sax, 
Helpless Giants, supra note 1, at 245. See supra text and notes at notes 68-69. For 
example, Professor Sax recounts an incident in 1966 when the Service sought the advice 
of the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior regarding the constitutionality of 
imposing federal zoning on private, unceded lands within an area that had been au-
thorized as a park. The Solicitor advised the Service that "in the absence of a cession by a 
state and acceptance by the United States of legislative jurisdiction over a specific area 
authorized for federal administration, the zoning statute suggested in your memoran-
dum would be held unconstitutional." Sax, Helpless Giants, supra note 1, at 247-48. 
Another telling example of the Park Service's hesitancy to regulate activity on non-
federal land was its response to a private entrepreneur's proposal to construct a 300-foot 
observation tower on private property overlooking the Gettysburg National Military 
Park. Although the Park Service and the President's Advisory Council on Historic 
Preservation both concluded that construction of the tower would have an adverse 
aesthetic impact on the park, the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior advised the 
Park Service that it lacked the constitutional authority to challenge the construction of 
the tower on private land. Sax, Helpless Giants, supra note 1, at 248. See also Pennsyl-
vania v. Morton, 381 F. Supp. 293 (D.D.C. 1974); Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg 
Battlefield Tower Inc., 454 Pa. 193, 311 A.2d 588 (1973). 
238. Sax, Helpless Giants, supra note 1, at 241-43. 
239. [d. 
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protect the federal reserves.240 With respect to activity occurring 
on non-federal land outside the boundaries of the national parks, 
Congress has given the Park Service virtually no regulatory au-
thority whatsoever.241 
As a result of the longstanding uncertainty regarding federal 
constitutional power to regulate activity on non-federal lands and 
Congress' reluctance to confer such authority statutorily, the 
Park Service's own policies regarding the regulation of incompat-
ible activity on non-federal lands have been marked by timidity.242 
The Service has long ascribed to the view that adverse private 
activity within park boundaries is better eliminated by govern-
ment acquisition than by regulation.243 Therefore, the Park Ser-
vice has pursued a policy of acquiring non-federal in holdings 
either by negotiating with the owner or, as a last resort, by 
condemnation.244 The effectiveness of this policy of acquisition 
however, has been limited by a chronic shortage of federal con-
demnation funds.245 It has also failed to address problems arising 
240. Id. Some federal lands, principally national seashore areas, are governed by 
statutes containing "Sword-of-Damocles" provisions. I d. at 242. Under such statutes, the 
Secretary of the Interior relinquishes its power to acquire or condemn private inholdings 
within the parks, so long as local governments impose zoning requirements which meet 
standards promulgated by the Secretary, and so long as landowners comply with these 
zoning ordinances. While the Secretary has no direct regulatory control over private 
landowners under such provisions, he has the power to condemn inholdings if local 
zoning statutes fail to comply with agency standards or if private landowners fail to 
comply with the local zoning requirements. See, e.g., Biderman v. Morton, 497 F.2d 141 
(2d Cir. 1974). However, such provisions have proved ineffective in some instances due to 
the large number of local zoning variances granted. Sax, Helpless Giants, supra note 1, at 
242. In response to this problem, the Department of the Interior has encouraged the 
Park Service to become actively involved in reviewing local ordinances and hearings to 
obtain variances in areas such as Fire Island in New York. Memorandum from So-
licitor's Office, Dept. of the Interior, to the Regional Solicitor, Boston (Sept. 12, 1982). 
241. Congress has granted the Park Service explicit authority to regulate lands out-
side the boundaries of a park on only one occasion; however, that authorization was 
repealed 70 years ago. Sax, Helpless Giants, supra note 1, at 244. 
242. See supra text and note at note 237. 
243. See Sax, Helpless Giants, supra note 1, at 243. 
244. Id. 
245. Id. at 242. See also Sax, Buying Scenery, supra note 11, at 713 n.15. This shortage 
of condemnation funds is further complicated by federal condemnation proceedings. 
Congress requires that advance permission be obtained from a congressional committee 
before a tract ofland can be acquired. Consequently, nOl'l-federallands in and around the 
national parks that threaten to be developed incompatibly must be identified well in 
advance of actual development. I d. at 713 n.21. Because the government uses its power of 
eminent domain only as a last resort, and because acquisition funds are often not 
authorized promptly enough to prevent incompatible private development, land values 
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from conduct occurring on non-federal land located outside the 
external boundaries of the parks. Despite the real and potential 
harm caused to parks by activity on non-federal lands immedi-
ately outside their boundaries, the Park Service in the past has 
failed to regulate activity on those adjacent lands.246 Rather, its 
attempts to eliminate adverse activity occurring on lands outside 
the parks have been limited to negotiating with local govern-
ments to pass protective zoning legislation.247 A clear articulation 
by the federal courts of Congress' authority to regulate non-
federal land for the protection of national parks and wilderness 
areas would give the Park Service the judicial authority neces-
sary to protect these resources more vigilantly. 
2. Brown and Block: Constitutional Basis for a More Aggressive 
Federal Policy Regarding the Protection of National Parks and 
Wilderness Areas 
The rationale of the Brown and Block decisions provides the 
constitutional basis for creating a more effective policy of regulat-
ing non-federal lands both within and immediately beyond the 
boundaries of specially designated federal land reserves. These 
decisions expand the federal government's power to protect its 
parks and wilderness areas in two crucial respects: first, they 
authorize Congress to regulate activity on non-federal property 
which interferes with the purpose for which those federal lands 
were reserved; and second, they permit federal regulation of in-
compatible activity occurring on state-owned property. 
on the tracts being condemned often skyrocket before the land is actually acquired. Since 
the owner of condemned property receives the full development value of his land, the 
government's condemnation policy has the ironic economic effect of encouraging private 
landowners to develop their land before condemnation so that they receive full value for 
their land. See id. 716-27. 
246. Sax, Helpless Giants, supra note 1, at 244. 
247. [d. Such negotiations are authorized by Congress. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 460ff-460-
3(f) (1982). Local governments, however, are ordinarily willing to impose fewer land use 
restrictions than the Park Service would prefer. In response to this problem, some of the 
newer park statutes contain provisions by which the federal government may offer 
subsidies and financial incentives to local, regional, and state governments to encourage 
passage of zoning laws designed to protect park lands. While these incentives are often 
attractive, local governments are not legally compelled to adopt federal recommenda-
tions. Federal dependence on local zoning, therefore, is not in itself sufficient to insure 
that the National Parks will be adequately protected. See Sax, Buying Scenery, supra 
note 11, at 715-16. 
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a. Regulation of Non-Federal Lands to Promote the Purpose of 
Adjacent Federal Property 
The Brown and Block decisions recognize that federal land 
dedicated for a particular purpose must be protected from activity 
inconsistent with its intended use, as well as from conduct which 
threatens to harm the land physically. In its brief to the Circuit 
Court in Block, intervenor/appellee Sierra Club noted: "[L]and is 
of value in light of its dedicated purpose. Thus, the use of a build-
ing as a symphony hall or the use of an area as a wilderness can 
be undermined as much by noise as by fire."248 Given Congress' 
broad declaration of legislative purpose in creating the national 
park and wilderness systems, the holdings of Brown and Block 
considerably expand the federal government's ability to regulate 
non-federal property in and around such federal enclaves. For 
example, section one of the National Parks Organic Act proclaims 
that the purpose of the parks is to "conserve the scenery and the 
national historic objects and the wildlife therein and to provide for 
the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as 
will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future genera-
tions."249 Under Brown and Block, the federal government pos-
sesses the constitutional power to regulate non-federal property 
so long as such regulations served to foster any of the goals 
embodied in this statement of legislative purpose. In theory, this 
statutory provision authorizes Congress or the Park Service to 
enjoin any activity on private property that would mar the aes-
thetic beauty of a National Park or threaten the ecological bal-
ance of the wildlife living therein. This broad scope of constitu-
tional discretion would encompass federal regulations to enjoin 
such aesthetic nuisances as the 300-foot observation tower over-
looking Gettysburg National Military Park,250 as well as environ-
mental hazards such as the logging operation adjacent to Red-
wood National Park.251 Similarly, in the Wilderness Act, which 
was enacted to secure the "benefits of an enduring resource of 
wilderness,"252 Congress defines "wilderness" in equally broad 
language. Section 1131(c) of the Act states that wilderness is an 
area where "earth and its community of life are untrammeled by 
248. Brief of Sierra Club, supra note 198, at 32. 
249. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). 
250. See supra text and notes at notes 7, 237. 
251. See supra text and note at note 6. 
252. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (1982). 
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man" and where "the imprint of man's work [is] substantially 
unnoticeable."253 Wilderness is further defined as an area that has 
retained its "primeval character and influence," and that "has 
outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive and un-
confined type of recreation."254 
Under the doctrine announced in Brown and Block, such sweep-
ing statements of legislative purpose regarding these federal re-
serves afford Congress wide parameters within which to prescribe 
regulations affecting non-federal property. For example, Con-
gress' power to preserve the natural character of wilderness 
areas for public use presumably includes within its scope the 
authority to promote quietude;255 to restrict modes of travel to 
"primitive methods;"256 to preserve the opportunity for solitude 
on those lands;257 and to protect the area from aesthetic intru-
sions.258 Under the holdings of Brown and Block, the authority to 
preserve the wilderness qualities of a federal wilderness area 
extends to activity on non-federal property which interferes with 
Congress' purpose for the use of such a federal reserve. 
b. Regulation of State Property 
The Brown and Block decisions are of further significance in-
asmuch as they recognize for the first time Congress' Property 
Clause power to regulate activity occurring on state property. 259 
The doctrine created by the Eighth Circuit in Block and Brown 
guarantees that the federal government will have the authority 
to impose restrictions on activity that threatens to cause harm to 
the federal lands or that interferes with congressional policy re-
garding their use, regardless of whether that activity occurs on 
federal, private, or state property. Furthermore, these decisions 
253. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1982). 
254. Id. 
255. Brief of Sierra Club, supra note 198, at 24. Quietude is recognized as a natural 
resource in the Minnesota Environmental Rights Law, MINN. STAT. § 116B.02 subd. 4 
(1978). See MPIRG v. White Bear Rod & Gun Club, 257 N.W.2d 726 (Minn. 1977) (enjoin-
ing trap shooting, in part because of its impact on quietude). 
256. See supra text at note 254. 
257. Id. 
258. See supra text at note 253. 
259. See supra text and note at note 235. In addition to Brown and Block, federal 
regulation of activity on state property has been upheld under the Property Clause in 
two cases where the federal regulation was designed to protect federal property from 
physical harm. See United States v. Arbo, 691 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. 
Lindsey, 595 F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1979). See supra note 136. 
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considerably broaden Congress' ability to regulate navigable 
lakes and rivers under the Property Clause, since title to the beds 
of navigable waters are generally retained by the respective 
states.260 
Judicial approval of federal authority over state lands and wa-
ters will be particularly important in protecting the nation's parks 
and wilderness areas. Many of these federal reserves contain 
within their boundaries substantial amounts of state land and 
water.261 For these areas, particularly national seashores, 
lakeshores, riverways, and other parks where regulation of the 
surface use of waters is vital to give effect to a federally desig-
nated purpose, federal authority to regulate state property is of 
special importance.262 
For these reasons, the Eighth Circuit's decisions in Brown and 
Block must be viewed as a major step toward insuring that the 
260. See generally Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845); Martin v. Lessee of 
Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842). 
261. There are 714,271 acres ofnon-Jederal public lands in the National Parks alone, 
and 1,300,958 in the entire National Park System administered by the Park Service. The 
following parks contain relatively large inholdings of non-federal public lands: 
# of Public Total 
PARK Non-Fed. Acres Acres 
Apostle Islands NL 26,266 67,884 
Appalachian NS Trail 27,337 101,464 
Assateague lsI. NS 21,848 39,630 
Biscayne NP 75,761 172,845 
Canaveral NS 15,782 87,627 
Cape Cod NS 15,643 44,596 
Channel Islands NP 124,554 249,353 
Cumberland Island NS 14,011 36,978 
Fire Island NS 12,535 19,518 
Golden Gate NRA 35,517 72,815 
Gulf Islands NS 35,641 139,775 
Kaluapapa NAP 10,729 10,902 
Ozark NS Riverway 14,062 80,698 
Redwood NP 34,678 110,130 
Rio Grande NSR 2,150 9,600 
St. Croix NSR 26,293 64,119 
Santa Monica Mtns. NRA 93,741 150,000 
Sleeping Bear Dunes NL 14,157 69,452 
Voyageurs NP SO,385 219,128 
Source: NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, SUMMARY OF ACREAGES (Sept. 30,1982). 
262. Since title to the beds of navigable waters are generally retained by the state, see 
supra text and note at note 260, such areas generally contain large areas of state-owned 
property. See figures reported supra at note 260. 
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nation's parks and wilderness areas will be absolutely sheltered 
from adverse activity on nearby non-federal property. In the 
absence of such federal authority to effect Congress' legislative 
intent, the government's power to create parks and wilderness 
areas would be rendered meaningless. In light of the vast range of 
adverse conduct that has afflicted the nation's protected federal 
enclaves in the past and that may arise in the future, the Eighth 
Circuit Court's approval of Congress' authority to regulate non-
federal property in Brown and Block was an appropriate and 
welcome expansion of the federal property power. 
The need to promote the legislative purpose underlying the 
creation of these special enclaves, however, represents only one 
manifestation of Congress' broad power under the Property 
Clause. In the following section, this Article will explore the need 
to place some limits on Congress' authority to regulate federal 
lands. 
IV. DEFINING THE LIMITS OF CONGRESS' PROPERTY CLAUSE 
POWER: RECONCILIATION OF PARK PROTECTION AND STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY 
Because of the pervasiveness of the federal government's land-
holdings in the United States,263 the Property Clause is a potentfal 
source of tremendous federal regulatory authority. The extension 
of Property Clause jurisdiction to neighboring non-federal lands 
renders this power even more expansive.264 By using its vast 
landholdings as a basis for exercising such a broad regulatory 
power, Congress could severely limit the ability of many states, 
particularly those in the West, to retain any meaningful legisla-
tive control over both federal and non-federal lands within their 
boundaries.265 
The prospect of such a devastating federal power underscores 
the importance of defining the limits of Congress' authority under 
263. See supra text and notes at notes 19-23. 
264. In an amicus brief submitted on behalf of the State in Minnesota v. Block, 660 
F.2d 1240 (1981), the National Governors' Association argued that in Alaska, Nevada, 
Idaho, Utah, and Oregon, which are more than 50% owned by the United States, "there 
would be no land or water areas under the jurisdiction of the state that might not 
plausibly be subject to federal regulation" as a result of the Block decision. Brief of the 
National Governors Association as Amicus Curiae in support of the Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari, Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944 
(1982). 
265. See supra text and notes at notes 19-23. 
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the Property Clause. Before considering such limits, however, it is 
instructive to compare Congress' Property power to the scope of 
its authority under the Commerce Clause. Like the Property 
Clause, the Commerce Clause is a plenary grant of power to 
Congress. An examination of the judicial construction of the 
Commerce power suggests that the federal powers approved in 
Brown and Block, while broader than any powers ever upheld 
under the Property Clause, would clearly fall within the well-
established scope of Congress' Commerce power. This analysis of 
the Commerce power will also provide a useful model for defining 
the scope of Congress' power under the Property Clause. 
A. Other Constitutional Grounds for Sustaining the Federal 
Regulations in Brown and Block 
The Eighth Circuit Court in Block held that Congress' restric-
tions on motor travel in the BWCA were within the purview of its 
authority under the Property Clause.266 The court therefore found 
it unnecessary to decide whether those restrictions could be sus-
tained under any of Congress' other constitutional powers.267 Al-
ternative constitutional bases may exist, however, for con-
gressional regulations like those at issue in Block and Brown. 
The Sierra Club intervened in Block, and submitted an appel-
late brief offering two alternative constitutional bases for uphold-
ing Congress' restrictions on motor travel in the BWCA that are 
pertinent to this article: (1) Congress' general power under the 
Commerce Clause;268 and (2) Congress' specific power under the 
Commerce Clause to regulate the navigable waters of the United 
States.269 While the scope of this article permits only a brief 
review of these powers, both of these powers appear to be 
sufficiently broad to sustain the federal regulation of activity on 
non-federal land within and adjacent to national parks, wilder-
ness areas, and other specially reserved federal enclaves.27o 
266. See supra text and notes at notes 194-223. 
267. Block, 660 F.2d at 1251 n.24. 
268. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
269. [d. The Supreme Court's decision in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), 
firmly established that the commerce power permits the exercise of federal jurisdiction 
over navigable waters of the United States. 
270. The Sierra Club also proposed in its brief to the circuit court that the BWCA W 
Act's regulation of motorized travel could be constitutionally sustained under its 
treaty-making power, which declares that "all treaties made, or which shall be made, 
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1. Congressional Power Under the Commerce Clause 
The Commerce Clause grants to Congress the power "to regu-
late Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several 
states, and with the Indian Tribes."271 The Supreme Court today 
interprets the Commerce Clause as a complete grant of power to 
Congress.272 With only one exception, the Court has not invali-
dated an act of Congress pursuant to the Commerce Clause in 
more than forty years.273 Congress' power to regulate commerce 
has been upheld even when the activity in question is intrastate 
in nature274 or has only a trivial impact on interstate commerce.275 
If individual activity might affect commerce when combined with 
similar small-scale activities, it falls within the purview of Con-
gress' regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause.276 
Moreover, Commerce power legislation will be upheld if there is 
any arguable connection between the regulation and commerce 
that touches more states than one.277 The nexus between the 
legislation and commerce may be based upon theoretical eco-
nomic relationships;278 legislative judgment concerning the eco-
nomic effects of certain activities or the directness of their rela-
under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land .... " U.S. 
CONST. art. VI, § 2. Congressional legislation that serves to implement the provisions of 
a treaty validly entered into under the authority ofthe United States will be given very 
limited judicial review. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); United States v. 
Rodriguez-Camacho, 468 F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. LaFroscia, 354 F. Supp. 
1338 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), afj'd, 485 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1973). The Sierra Club argued that the 
BWCAW Act of 1978 implemented the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 between the 
United States and Canada. That treaty sought to: (1) preserve the boundary waters as 
an international wilderness; (2) prohibit pollution of the boundary waters; (3) set the 
order of procedure to be observed among various uses of the area; and (4) prohibit actions 
of one nation that resulted in injury to the use of the boundary water on the other side of 
the border. See State v. Kuluvar, 266 Minn. 408, 123 N.W.2d 669 (1963). See generally Brief 
of Sierra Club, supra note 198, at 46-49. Since the vast majority of the nation's parks and 
wilderness areas are not affected by international treaties, this article will not discuss 
Congress' power to legislate pursuant to this power. 
271. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
272. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 161 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter cited as J. Nowak]. 
273. But see National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
274. See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 
146, 154 (1971); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 122-24 (1942). 
275. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. at 127-28; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 
294, 301 (1964). 
276. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. at 127-28. 
277. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. at 301. 
278. J. Nowak, supra note 272, at 161. 
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tionship to commerce will be given judicial deference.279 Further-
more, federal legislation under the Commerce Clause will be up-
held even if it invades the traditional subject matter of local police 
power legislation.280 
Congress may also exercise its commerce power for purposes 
unrelated to commerce per se.281 Federal laws relating to the 
environment, for example, have been routinely upheld by review-
ing courts under the Commerce Clause.282 Once a link between 
commerce and an environmental regulation is established, the 
judiciary will intervene only where a legislative determination is 
found to be irrational.283 
Given this broad judicial interpretation of federal Commerce 
powers, congressional regulation of non-federal property deemed 
by Congress to be necessary to promote the designated purpose of 
a national park or wilderness area could be sustained under the 
Commerce Clause. The nexus between the regulation of such 
federal reserves and interstate commerce is sufficiently strong to 
meet the exceptionally broad test of constitutionality under the 
Commerce Clause. Parks and wilderness areas are used by per-
sons who engage in interstate travel.284 Furthermore, the incom-
patible use of nearby non-federal lands could have a potentially 
adverse impact upon the environment, wildlife, and natural 
beauty of those federal enclaves.285 The Supreme Court has even 
upheld the constitutionality of congressional legislation enacted 
279. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. at 129. 
280. See generally Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (federal statute prohibit-
ing loan-sharking activity is within Congress' power under the Commerce Clause, and 
may be applied to such activity even when completely local in nature). 
281. J. Nowak, supra note 272, at 162. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 
379 U.S. 241 (1964) (civil rights); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (civil rights); 
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (criminal loan-sharking activity). 
282. See, e.g., United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974); 
Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1978); Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land & 
Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Hawaii 1979). 
283. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. at 258; Katzenbach v. McClung, 
379 U.S. at 304. 
284. For example, in United States v. 967,905 Acres of Land, 305 F. Supp. 83 (D. Minn. 
1969), rev'd, 447 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 974 (1972), the Court 
described the Boundary Waters as "one of the last remaining areas of its kind in North 
America [which] attracts Boy Scouts, campers, sportsmen, Izaak Walton League mem-
bers and others from the entire United States and Canada, usually for several-day to 
several-week canoe trips, fishing, outings, etc." 305 F. Supp. at 85 (emphasis added). 
285. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 376 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974); 398 F. Supp. 284 
(N.D. Cal. 1975) (Redwood National Park); Pennsylvania v. Morton, 381 F. Supp. 293 
(D.D.C. 1974)(Gettysburg National Military Park). See supra text and notes at notes 6-7. 
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for the protection of the quality of commerce,286 and for the pro-
tection of the ultimate "consumer activity" that occurs after the 
interstate commerce itself has come to an end.287 Thus, Congress 
could impose restrictions on the use of non-federal property lo-
cated near parks and wilderness areas on the theory that such 
adverse activity might mar the experience of visiting tourists, 
thereby discouraging interstate travel to those protected areas.288 
Aside from the parks and wilderness areas themselves, other 
resorts, tourist businesses, and outfitters located near such areas 
derive economic benefit from customers drawn to the parks from 
around the United States.289 Congressional measures designed to 
promote the designated purposes of parks and wilderness areas 
may also have a sufficient nexus with this type of commerce to 
bring such regulations within the ambit of Congress' broad com-
merce power.290 
Thus, a sufficient connection exists between interstate com-
merce and the kinds of federal regulations at issue in BrO'UJn and 
Block for Congress to enact such regulations under the Commerce 
Clause. Given the Supreme Court's great deference to con-
gressional judgment under the Commerce Clause,291 it is unlikely 
that federal legislation designed to further Congress' policy re-
specting the use of federal property, such as the proscription of 
motorboats within the BWCA, would be struck down on Com-
merce Clause grounds. Therefore, even if future courts restrict 
Congress' power to regulate non-federal land under the Property 
Clause, the federal government could alternatively invoke its 
286. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 381 (1946). 
287. United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 697-98 (1948) (federal statute prohibiting 
the mislabeling of a food, drug, or cosmetic while such article is held for sale after 
shipment in interstate commerce is within Congress' Commerce power). Similarly, Con-
gress could enact protective legislation regarding National Parks and Wilderness Areas 
to enhance the experience of visiting tourists, even though commerce generated by their 
interstate travel to the area has come to an end. See also Sax, Helpless Giants, supra 
note 1, at 257. 
288. Sax, Helpless Giants, supra note 1, at 257. See generally Heart of Atlanta Motel v. 
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 394 (1964), where 
the Supreme Court recognized that the effect on interstate travel caused by racial 
discrimination in hotels and restaurants was a constitutional basis for sustaining Title 
II of the Civil Rights Act under the Commerce Clause. 
289. See Brief of Sierra Club, supra note 198, at 44. 
290. [d. at 44-45. 
291. See supra text and notes at notes 271-83. 
526 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 11:479 
commerce power to preserve national parks and wilderness areas 
for their intended purposes.292 
2. Congressional Power to Regulate Navigable Waters 
It is well established that Congress may, as part of its Com-
merce power, regulate the navigable waters of the United 
States.293 The Supreme Court has recognized this power over 
navigable waters to be plenary.294 The Court has also recognized 
that Congress may exercise its authority over navigable waters 
for purposes other than navigation per se.295 
Under its power to regulate navigable waters, Congress has 
enacted legislation to further environmental interests.296 For ex-
ample, in Zabel v. Tabb,297 the Fifth Circuit upheld the Secretary 
of the Army's298 refusal to authorize a dredge-and-fill project in 
navigable waters because of its effect on the marine ecology, even 
though the proposed project admittedly would have had no ad-
verse impact on navigation.299 The Court in Zabel stated that the 
proper inquiry for determining the validity of a Congressional 
regulation of wildlife in navigable waters was "whether there is a 
basis for the Congressional judgment that the activity regulated 
has a substantial effect on interstate commerce."300 The Zabel 
292. See generally Brief of Sierra Club, supra note 198, at 42-45; Sax, Helpless Giants, 
supra note 1, at 256-58. 
293. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 89 (1824). 
294. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 173-74 (1979); United States v. 
Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 424 (1940). 
295. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. at 174. See also United States v. Standard 
Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966) (application of § 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 to 
discharge of oil on navigable waters that did not obstruct navigation upheld); United 
States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940) (federal license requirement for a 
private dam on navigable waters that included conditions unrelated to navigable waters 
upheld); Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970) (refusal by Army Corps of Engineers 
to issue permit to dredge and fill in navigable waters because of adverse ecological 
impact upheld, even though no threat of interference with navigation). 
296. See, e.g., Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971); 
DiVosta Rentals, Inc. v. Lee, 488 F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Stoeco Homes, 
Inc., 498 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1974). 
297. 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970). 
298. Under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, the creation of any obstruction to the 
navigable capacity of any waters of the United States is prohibited unless it is au-
thorized by the Secretary of the Army. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d at 207. 
299. Id. at 202-03. The Corps of Engineers denied the riparian landowner a permit for 
the project partially on the basis of the findings of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 
Dept. of the Interior, that the dredging and filling "would have a distinctly harmful 
effect on the fish and wildlife resources of Boca Raton Bay." Id. at 202. 
300. Id. at 203. 
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Court found that the potential destruction of marine life and the 
ecological balance within the navigable waters had a sufficient 
impact on commerce to sustain the regulation under Congress' 
Commerce Clause authority.301 Other courts have similarly al-
lowed the federal government to regulate navigable waters for 
conservation and environmental purposes under its Commerce 
power.302 
Under this theory, a strong argument could be made that the 
regulations at issue in the Block case, while primarily designed to 
further the wilderness character of the BWCA, are substantially 
related to commerce.303 Thus, the regulations could also be sus-
tained as an exercise of Congress' authority to control navigable 
waters under the Commerce Clause.304 
301. [d. at 204. 
302. See DiVosta Rentals v. Lee, 488 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1973) (Secretary of the Army 
has authority to refuse to grant permit to fill navigable waters on ground that it would 
impair the aesthetic qualities of the waters and the marine environment of the 
shoreline); United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1974) (Congress' 
legislative powers under the Commerce Clause are broad enough to encompass federal 
regulation of any activities affecting the marine ecology). See also United States v. 
Ashland Oil and Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974), where the court upheld the 
validity of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to prohibit the discharge of pollut-
ants into non-navigable tributaries of navigable waters. The Ashland Oil decision is 
particularly analogous to the BWCA motorboat regulations, inasmuch as the court 
expressly acknowledged that Congress' authority to control pollution of navigable wa-
ters derived in part from the adverse impact of pollution on fishing for commercial 
purposes and upon the recreational use and enjoyment of rivers and lakes for fishing, 
boating, and swimming by interstate travelers. [d. at 1325, 1328-29. 
303. See supra text and notes at notes 271-92. See also United States v. Ashland Oil & 
Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974). 
304. The BWCA motorboat regulations alternatively could be upheld under the doc-
trine of the reservation of water rights. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 
(1976). In Cappaert, a rancher on private property adjacent to Devil's Hole National 
Monument pumped water from a well on his land, consequently lowering the water level 
of an underground pool on the federal land and endangering a rare desert fish that 
inhabited the pool. The Supreme Court upheld the authority ofthe government to enjoin 
the defendant from pumping water from his well, stating: 
[W]hen the Federal Government withdraws its land from the public domain and 
reserves it for a federal purpose, the Government, by implication, reserves 
appurtenant water thus unappropriated to the extent needed to accomplish the 
purpose of the reservation .... Reservation of water rights is empowered by the 
Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, which permits federal regulation of navigable 
streams, and the Property Clause, Art. IV, § 3, which permits federal regulation 
of federal lands. 
[d. at 138. While the facts ofCappaert are distinguishable from Block, it is arguable that 
the restrictions on motorboat use were regulations over waters appurtenant to federal 
land withdrawn from the public domain, and that the regulations were needed to 
accomplish the purpose of the reservation of the federal lands. See Brief of Sierra Club, 
supra note 198, at 41-42 n.37. 
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The arguments above suggest that even if the federal govern-
ment's power under the Property Clause is restricted in future 
court decisions, other well-established constitutional grounds al-
ready exist upon which to base Congressional regulations of non-
federal property. The Commerce Clause clearly bestows upon 
Congress the constitutional authority to regulate activity on non-
federal lands and waters when necessary to protect and enhance 
national parks and wilderness areas. Thus, the Eighth Circuit 
decisions in Brown and Block upheld no federal regulations that 
could not have been sustained under the Commerce Clause. 
Regardless of whether such regulations are sustained under 
the Property Clause or the Commerce Clause, their enactment 
will result in an identical displacement of the traditional author-
ity of the states to exercise their police powers over private and 
state lands within their respective borders. In either case, the 
question ultimately boils down to a basic issue of federalism: how 
should the federal government's interest in fostering the declared 
purpose of its property be reconciled with the states' interest in 
maintaining their respective sovereignty? 
B. The Tenth Amendment Limitation on Congress' Power under 
the Property Clause 
In the Block case, the State of Minnesota contended that the 
federal government's attempt to regulate motorized traffic within 
the BWCA constituted a "blatant . . . assault on state 
sovereignty."305 Thus, in addition to arguing that those regula-
tions exceeded federal authority under the Property Clause,306 the 
State asserted that federal regulation of activity on state-owned 
property constituted a violation of the Tenth Amendment.307 The 
court, however, found that the State had not satisfied the re-
quirements outlined by the Supreme Court necessary to sustain a 
Tenth Amendment challenge, and therefore upheld the federal 
statute at issue.308 
The Block court followed the test outlined by the Supreme 
Court in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 
305. Brief of State of Minnesota, supra note 228, at 30. 
306. See supra text and notes at notes 194-232. 
307. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states 
respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST., Amend. x. 
308. Block, 660 F.2d at 1253. 
309. 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
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Inc. 309 as the appropriate standard for reviewing Tenth Amend-
ment claims. In Hodel, the Supreme Court narrowed the holding 
of its landmark decision in National League of Cities v. Usery,310 
and upheld under the Commerce Clause a federal statute regulat-
ing the surface mining industry. In so doing, the Hodel Court 
established the following three-prong test which must be satisfied 
in order to strike down a federal statute under the Tenth 
Amendment: 
(1) there must be a showing that the statute regulates the 
"States as States"; 
(2) the regulation must address matters that are indisputa-
bly attributes of state sovereignty; and 
(3) the state must show that its compliance with the federal 
statute would directly impair its ability to structure in-
tegral operations in areas of traditional state functions.3ll 
Applying this test to the federal statute at issue in Block, the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the restrictions on 
motorboats and snowmobiles regulated the activities of private 
individuals, not the state itself.312 The court recognized a distinc-
tion made by the Supreme Court in Hodel "between congressional 
regulation of private persons and businesses 'necessarily subject 
to the dual sovereignty of the government of the nation and of the 
state in which they reside,' and federal regulation 'directed not to 
private citizens but to the states as states.' "313 The court acknowl-
edged that the restriction on motorized travel in the BWCA did 
interfere with the State's freedom to regulate the waters in that 
area.314 The court stated, however, that the mere assumption of 
310. 426 u.s. 833 (1976). National League of Cities is the only decision in the last four 
decades in which the Supreme Court has used the Tenth Amendment to invalidate a 
federal statute. In that case, decided within one week of Kleppe, the Supreme Court 
struck down Congress' extension of the Fair Labor Standards Act to cover employees of 
the state and local governments. The Court held that application of that Act impinged 
upon the states' ability and discretion to carry out their sovereign functions even though 
the regulation in question was within the scope of congressional authority under the 
Commerce Clause. Id. at 851-52. 
The reach of the Tenth Amendment as defined in National League of Cities, however, 
was narrowed significantly in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 
Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981), which held that federal regulation of surface mining did not 
constitute a sufficient interference with state sovereignty to invoke the ban of the Tenth 
Amendment. For a discussion of Hodel, see infra text and notes at notes 311-13. 
311. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 286-87. 
312. Block, 660 F.2d at 1252. 
313. Id. (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 286) (emphasis added). 
314. Id. at 1252. 
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the State's traditional police power by the federal government 
was not in itself sufficient grounds for a Tenth Amendment viola-
tion.3l5 Finding that the motorboat restrictions at issue applied to 
activity occurring both on and off federal property,3l6 the court 
held that the statute did not regulate the State as a State.3l7 
Therefore, the court concluded that the State had failed to meet 
the first requirement of the Hodel test necessary to sustain a 
Tenth Amendment claim.3lB 
Although the Block court found no Tenth Amendment in-
fringement under the narrow test outlined in Hodel, its opinion 
did not entirely preclude the possibility of invoking the Tenth 
Amendment in future Property Clause cases. In Block, the State 
argued that the federal regulation of activity on state waters 
constituted a regulation of the State as a State.3l9 The court 
rejected this argument on the rather narrow ground that the 
State did not "own" the waters in the same manner as it owned 
the land under them, but merely controlled their use as an aspect 
of its sovereignty.32o The court reasoned that this authority, like 
the state's other police powers, must yield to a valid exercise of 
federal authority.32l The court therefore held that the federal 
regulation of conduct on state waters did not amount to a regula-
tion of the State as a State. 
The court noted in a footnote, however, that federal regulation 
315. The court quoted the Supreme Court's declaration in Hodel that, "the Court long 
ago rejected the suggestion that Congress invades areas reserved to the states by the 
Tenth Amendment simply because it exercises its authority in a manner that displaces 
the states' exercise of their police powers." Id. (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 291). 
316. Block, 660 F.2d at 1252. 
317. Id. 
318. Id. See supra text at note 311. A final important factor in the Eighth Circuit 
Court's rejection of the State's Tenth Amendment claim was that the regulation in 
question did not entirely preempt the State's jurisdiction over the waters in the BWCA. 
Id. at 1253. The Act explicitly reserves to the State the authority to exercise its police 
powers with respect to the waters so long as the exercise of that power is not less 
stringent than the federal regulations regarding motorboat and snowmobile use. Bound-
ary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-495, § 15,92 Stat. 1649 
(1978), § 15. The Act also protects the State's jurisdiction with regard to fish and wildlife 
in the wilderness area, id., § 14, establishes joint state/federal administration and protec-
tion of the mining protection area and of the lands adjacent thereto owned or controlled 
by the state, id., § 16, and protects the state's right to exercise civil and criminal 
jurisdiction within the wilderness area and impose land use and environmental health 
controls on the non-federal areas within the area. See generally Block, 660 F.2d at 1253. 
319. Block, 660 F.2d at 1252. 
320. Id. See supra text and note at note 260. 
321. Id. 
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of state land may require a "slightly different analysis" than 
regulation of state water.322 The court failed to indicate what this 
"slightly different analysis" entailed. Instead, it declared that 
even though the regulations at issue affected the State as a 
landowner, they still remained essentially regulations of private 
conduct.323 The court further stated that even if the BWCA W Act 
did regulate the State as a State, Minnesota had failed to meet 
the second and third requirements of the Hodel test.324 The impli-
cation of this footnote, despite the court's holding, is that federal 
regulation of state land may, in some circumstances, constitute a 
regulation of the State as a State.325 
Moreover, the Tenth Amendment could serve as an effective 
limit on Congress' Property power if the Supreme Court were to 
establish a different test for federal regulations under the Prop-
erty Clause. The test outlined by the Supreme Court in Hodel has 
only been applied to congressional provisions made under the 
Commerce Clause.326 The Court has explicitly reserved for future 
determination the extent to which the Tenth Amendment bars 
federal legislation under constitutional provisions other than the 
Commerce Clause.327 Whether a different and less rigid standard 
for Tenth Amendment claims should be applied to Property 
Clause legislation is a question which the Supreme Court must 
eventually resolve.328 
322. Block, 660 F.2d at 1252 n.28. 
323. ld. 
324. ld. 
325. ld. See supra text at note 311. 
326. The Supreme Court has examined the Tenth Amendment issue in four cases 
since its landmark decision in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
Each of these cases involved federal legislation enacted pursuant to the Commerce 
Clause. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); 
Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982); United Transp. 
Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982); and EEOC v. Wyoming, _ U.S. _, 103 
S. Ct. 1054 (1983). 
327. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 852 n.17; Hodel v. Virginia Surface 
Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 454 U.S. at 287 n.28. 
328. In an amicus brief in support of Minnesota's petition for certiorari in Block, the 
State of South Dakota argued that the Hodel test was inappropriate for examining 
federal regulations under the Property Clause. Brief of Amicus Curiae in support of 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 
at 4, Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944 (1982). The 
State asserted that application of the Hodel test to Property Clause legislation created 
the possibility that "Congress could effectively strip a state of substantially all of its 
police powers." ld. at 11. The State therefore suggested that federal regulation of 
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Barring the establishment of an independent Tenth Amend-
ment standard for legislation enacted pursuant to the Property 
Clause, however, it appears unlikely that the Tenth Amendment 
will impose any meaningful limitations on Congress' Property 
power. The Block case suggests that its only conceivable applica-
tion would be to prohibit the federal regulation of state activity on 
state lands.329 However, in its most recent Tenth Amendment 
decision, EEOC v. Wyoming,330 the Supreme Court cast doubt 
upon the power of a state even to resist a federal regulation of 
state activity.331 This decision, coupled with other Supreme Court 
decisions since National League of Cities v. Usery, suggests that 
the Court is in the process of cutting back on the Tenth Amend-
ment as an affirmative limit on federal power.332 As a result, there 
is no meaningful limitation on Congress' Property power ex-
pressly contained in the Constitution. 
There is, however, one constant check on Congress' Property 
Clause powers that arises outside the framework of the 
Constitution-the political power of the states and their con-
stituencies. A proper constitutional analysis of the scope of Con-
gress' power under the Property Clause suggests that the political 
process provides the only real check on this vast grant of constitu-
tional authority. 
non-federal property should be declared violative of the Tenth Amendment when any 
one of the Hodel factors are met, not all three factors as in a Commerce Clause case.ld. at 
14-15. The State felt that such a distinction between Tenth Amendment analysis under 
the Commerce Clause and Property Clause was justified by the relatively superior 
position of the Commerce Clause in the Constitutional framework. Id. at 16. 
329. See supra text and notes at notes 309-25. 
330. _ U.S. _, 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983). 
331. In EEOC, the Supreme Court examined a federal statute prohibiting employers 
from discriminating against any employee or potential employee between the ages of 40 
and 70 on the basis of age. The Court upheld the statute as applied to the State of 
Wyoming as an employer. Despite the similarity of the facts of this case to the facts in 
National League o/Cities, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), see supra note 347, the Court distinguished 
the latter case and held that application of the federal regulation to the State did not 
constitute a violation of the Tenth Amendment. The Court's decision in EEOC casts 
considerable doubt upon the vitality of the doctrine announced in National League 0/ 
Cities, and suggests at the very least that the latter case will be construed narrowly in 
the future. 
332. In each Tenth Amendment case decided since National League o/Cities, 426 U.S. 
833 (1976), the Supreme Court has rejected the plaintiff's assertion of a Tenth Amend-
ment violation. See supra cases cited at note 326. Moreover, the Court has taken every 
possible opportunity to narrow the holding of National League o/Cities. See supra text 
and notes at notes 310-11, 331. 
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C. Defining the Limitations of Congress' Property Power: The 
Rational Basis Test and the Role of the Political Process 
As a matter of policy, some check must be placed upon Con-
gress' Property power to prevent it from displacing completely the 
police power authority of those states that contain vast areas of 
federalland.333 Clearly, Congress should not make broad legisla-
tive policy decisions in a state solely on the basis of its extensive 
property interests in that state.334 As one commentator has noted, 
it would be unreasonable for Congress to "nullify the sales tax in 
eighty-seven percent of Nevada, or permit gambling in sixty-five 
percent of Utah."335 On the other hand, it would be equally inap-
propriate for the judiciary, in its attempt to impose a limit on 
Congress' Property Clause power, to inquire into the motive or 
wisdom of a particular congressional determination regarding 
federal property. Past Supreme Court decisions have made clear 
that courts should not exercise broad judicial discretion in review-
ing express congressional determinations under the Property 
Clause.336 Thus, circumscription of the federal property power 
must not be achieved at the expense of judicial deference to 
Congress' legislative judgments. 
Some commentators have proposed a judicial balancing of com-
peting federal, state, and private interests to determine the valid-
ity of Property Clause regulations.337 Such a test, however, would 
invariably permit substantial judicial discretion in reviewing 
Congress' decisions and produce speculative results.338 Further-
333. See supra text and notes at notes 19-23. 
334. See United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 30 (1940). 
335. Note, The Property Power, Federalism, and the Equal Footing Doctrine, 80 Co-
LUMBIA L.R. 817, 825 (1980). 
336. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 536. See supra text and notes at notes 108-13. 
337. Professor Gaetke suggests that the law of nuisance provides a basis for determin-
ing when Property Clause regulations of conduct on non-federal lands constitute "need-
ful" regulations "respecting the federal lands." The ultimate objective of such a test is to. 
weigh the utility of the congressional policy for the use of federal lands and the effec-
tiveness of the particular regulation in accomplishing that policy against the utility of 
the regulated conduct and the likelihood of its interference with the congressional policy. 
See Gaetke, supra note 96, at 395-402 (1981). 
Similarly, Professor Sax proposes that the National Park Service should be limited to 
curbing conduct which may be described as "nuisance-like." He suggests that Congress 
should grant the Park Service the authority to define nuisance-like activity for itself, and 
to develop a federal common law of nuisance for the parks through litigation. See Sax, 
Helpless Giants, supra note 1, at 266-67. 
338. For example, in applying his suggested balancing test to the facts in Kleppe v. 
New Mexico, 426 U.S. 523 (1976), Professor Gaetke finds that Congress' policy of providing 
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more, any such limitation of congressional authority would be 
inherently inconsistent with the extremely broad judicial con-
struction of the federal Commerce power.339 In light of the perva-
sive federal intrusions upon traditional state police power matters 
that have been recently upheld under the Commerce Clause,340 it 
is questionable whether federal regulations regarding federal 
property, particularly those enacted to protect national parks and 
wilderness areas, are appropriate places to begin to redress the 
balance of state and federal power.341 
Judicial construction of the federal Commerce power suggests 
an appropriate model for defining the limits of Congress' author-
ity under the Property Clause. Under modern constitutional doc-
trine, reviewing courts will only strike down a legislative deter-
mination under the Commerce Clause if it is found to have no 
rational basis.342 With one exception, a federal regulation enacted 
under the Commerce Clause has not been struck down by the 
judicial branch in over forty years.343 
The scope of Congress' authority under the Property Clause 
should be similarly defined. Like the Commerce Clause, the Prop-
erty Clause is a plenary grant of constitutional authority to Con-
gress, and has been interpreted extremely liberally by the 
courts.344 For purposes of determining an appropriate level of 
judicial review, there is no difference between a complete grant of 
a sanctuary for wild animals is a "commendable public objective for the use of the federal 
lands," and that the statute in question is a rational method of furthering that policy. 
Nonetheless, he finds that these interests are outweighed by the utility of capturing wild 
animals on federal land and the interference with the interests of private landowners. 
Gaetke, supra note 96, at 400-01. Exactly how Professor Gaetke arrives at this conclusion 
is unclear. His example illustrates that the application of such a balancing test to 
determine the constitutionality of a regulation of non-federal property would permit the 
judiciary to substitute its judgment concerning the needfulness of certain legislation for 
that of Congress. Professor Gaetke concedes that the results under such a test would be 
"speculative" and would permit the judiciary "considerable leeway in resolving the 
conflict between competing uses." He states that in most situations, however, "it would 
appear that the judicial deference shown Congress regarding other uses of the Property 
Clause is likely to extend to judiciary review of its use to regulate conduct on non-federal 
lands." Id. at 401. 
339. See supra text and notes at notes 271-92. 
340. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (regulation of loan-sharking 
activities); Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973) (federal regulation 
pre-empting local governments from imposing curfews at airports in their own cities). 
341. See Sax, Helpless Giants, supra note 1, at 254-55. 
342. See supra text and notes at notes 277-83. 
343. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). See supra text and 
notes at notes 273, 310. 
344. See supra text and notes at notes 108-13, 151-57. 
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power to regulate commerce and a complete grant of power to 
make needful rules and regulations respecting federal property. 
Judicial review of congressional enactments pursuant to the 
Property Clause should therefore be limited to determining 
whether there exists a rational basis for Congress' action.345 Only 
if it is irrational for Congress to conclude that the legislation in 
question constitutes a "needful" rule or regulation "respecting" 
federal property should a federal statute be struck down as ex-
ceeding the scope of the Property Clause.346 
Under this standard of review, Congress admittedly would 
enjoy broad authority to regulate activity on federal property. 
However, federal authority under this standard certainly would 
be no greater than Congress' current constitutional power over 
federal property, which the Supreme Court has declared to be 
"without limitations."347 
This constitutional test would also permit Congress to regulate 
activity on non-federal property in certain circumstances. Con-
gress should be permitted to regulate activity on non-federal 
property in order to protect federal lands from physical harm.348 A 
regulation necessary to prevent physical damage to federal prop-
erty is clearly "needful." Similarly, such regulations do not cease 
to be regulations "respecting" federal property merely because 
they affect activity on non-federal land. 
In the absence of a threat of physical harm to federal property, 
however, the nexus between a regulation of non-federal property 
and the federal property itself is not so obvious. In such cases, 
reviewing courts must scrutinize federal legislation more closely 
to determine whether it is a "needful" regulation "respecting" the 
federal property. In such situations, a declaration of con-
gressional purpose regarding the use of federal property should 
be required to sustain a federal statute under the Property 
Clause.349 In the absence of an express congressional declaration 
of policy regarding the use of federal property, there is no nexus 
between the regulation of non-federal lands and federal property 
per se. Without a declaration of purpose, therefore, Congress' 
345. See supra text and notes at notes 277-83. 
346. ld. 
347. See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. at 536 (1976). See supra text and note at 
note 86. 
348. See supra text and notes at notes 131-36. 
349. See supra text and notes at notes 173-232, 248-58. 
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determination that a regulation of non-federal property is a 
"needful" regulation "respecting" federal property would be irra-
tional. Under this interpretation of the Property Clause, Congress 
would be permitted to regulate non-federal property in and 
around national parks, wilderness areas, and other specially re-
served federal enclaves to insure their protection and preserva-
tion.350 Such authority to regulate activity on non-federal prop-
erty antithetical to the designated purposes of such federal re-
serves is essential to fulfilling Congress' intent underlying their 
creation.351 Moreover, the extension of federal Property Clause 
jurisdiction to these areas constitutes only a limited intrusion on 
the sovereignty of the states. Under the construction of the Prop-
erty Clause proposed above, Congress' power to regulate non-
federal property would not apply to non-federal lands located near 
all federal property; rather, it would apply only to those non-
federal lands located adjacent to federal enclaves reserved for a 
specific purpose.352 
Furthermore, far from upholding an unlimited federal power to 
regulate non-federal property, this analysis would only permit 
Congress to exercise authority beyond the boundaries of federal 
property for specific statutorily designated purposes.353 Given the 
federal government's strong interest in preserving these enclaves 
for their intended uses and the substantial public benefits to be 
derived therefrom, the resulting additional infringement on state 
sovereignty is relatively insignificant. 
The real threat to state sovereignty lies not in the exercise of 
federal regulatory authority over non-federal property adjacent 
to parks and wilderness areas, but in the exercise of the federal 
government's unlimited power over its own property.354 Under 
the latter power, Congress has a potentially devastating reach of 
power over the Western states.355 The mere existence of this bare 
constitutional power, however, does not in itself affect the balance 
of state and federal power; it only becomes a threat to state 
sovereignty if it is exercised indiscriminately. It is the responsibil-
350. See supra text and notes at notes 248-58. 
351. [d. 
352. [d. See also text and notes at notes 2-5. 
353. See supra text and notes at notes 2-5, 248-58. 
354. See generally Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976). See supra text and notes 
at notes 137-61. 
355. See supra text and notes at notes 19-35. 
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ity of the states, both individually and collectively, to use their 
political powers to insure that Congress does not wield its broad 
constitutional authority inappropriately. 
For years, Congress has possessed the bare constitutional au-
thority under its Commerce power to reach virtually every aspect 
of state activity.356 Thus far, it has refrained from exercising that 
power so as to emasculate completely the sovereignty of the 
states. The restraints of political pressure have succeeded in pre-
venting Congress from using this vast authority to destroy the 
balance of state and federal power. The Supreme Court has long 
recognized that the notion of a political check on Congress' ex-
press constitutional powers is inherent in our basic constitutional 
structure.357 In Gibbons v. Ogden,358 Chief Justice Marshall articu-
lated this very concept: 
The power over commerce ... is vested in Congress as abso-
lutely as it would be in a single government, having in its 
constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of the 
power as are found in the constitution of the United States. 
The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with 
the people, and the inJluence which their constituents possess 
at elections, are ... the sole restraints on which they have 
relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on 
which the people must often rely solely, in all representative 
governments. 359 
Effective restraints on the exercise of Congress' Commerce power 
must proceed from political rather than from judicial processes.360 
Similarly, it is the political process, not the judicial process, that 
should restrain Congress from abusing its constitutional power 
under the Property Clause. 
v. CONCLUSION 
It is inevitable that America's national parks and wilderness 
areas will in the future be subject to the effects of adverse activity 
occurring on nearby non-federal property. If the public policy 
underlying the establishment of these treasured national re-
serves is to be truly upheld, Congress must possess the authority 
356. See supra text and notes at notes 271-92. 
357. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 
U.S. 111, 120 (1942). 
358. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
359. Id. at 197. 
360. I d. See also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. at 120. 
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to regulate activity on non-federal property that threatens their 
intended purposes. When enacted to further the congressional 
policy regarding the use of specific federal lands, such regulations 
constitute "needful" regulations "respecting" federal property, 
and should be upheld as a valid exercise of Congress' plenary 
power under the Property Clause. The Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals appropriately recognized the federal government's au-
thority to enact such legislation in United States v. Brown and 
Minnesota v. Block. 
The Property Clause is a plenary grant of authority to Congress 
and as such, should be construed as broadly as the Commerce 
Clause. Admittedly, such a broad interpretation of the Property 
Clause empowers Congress with the potential authority to exer-
cise vast legislative control over the states, particularly those in 
the West. However, the appropriate restraints upon this vast 
constitutional power should stem from the political process, and 
not from the courts. 
It is important for Congress to be cognizant of the states' indi-
vidual and collective interests in retaining their sovereignty over 
matters within their boundaries. It is even more important, how-
ever, that Congress have the bare constitutional power to enact 
certain legislation respecting federal property when the federal 
interest in preserving the parks and wilderness areas outweighs 
the particular local interests which threaten these national re-
sources. It is the role of Congress, not the judiciary, to determine 
when such regulations respecting federal property are needful. 
Congressional regulation of non-federal property adjacent to na-
tional parks and wilderness areas should therefore be upheld 
under the Property Clause when such regulations are necessary 
to promote the purposes for which such federal reserves were 
established. 
